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“BANG!”: SHOTSPOTTER GUNSHOT DETECTION TECHNOLOGY,
PREDICTIVE POLICING, AND MEASURING TERRY’S REACH
Harvey Gee*
ShotSpotter technology is a rapid identification and response system used in ninety
American cities that is designed to detect gunshots and dispatch police. ShotSpotter is
one of many powerful surveillance tools used by local police departments to purportedly
help fight crime, but they often do so at the expense of infringing upon privacy rights and
civil liberties. This Article expands the conversation about ShotSpotter technology
considerably by examining the adjacent Fourth Amendment issues emanating from its
use. For example, law enforcement increasingly relies on ShotSpotter to create reasonable suspicion where it does not exist. In practice, the use of ShotSpotter increases the
frequency of police interactions, which also increases the risk of Black Americans
becoming the victims of police brutality or harassment. Such racialized policing facilitates the status quo of violence and bias against Black Americans.
This Article uses recent cases from the D.C., the Fourth, and Seventh Circuits as a
foundation to argue that officers arriving on the scene to investigate a gunshot sound they
were alerted of via ShotSpotter technology should not be allowed to use the gunshot sound
as the basis of reasonable suspicion and subsequent search and seizure. At the heart of
this Article is the argument that the use of ShotSpotter technology is unconstitutional
under City of Indianapolis v. Edmond because it is not used for a specific law enforcement
purpose beyond preventing crime generally. Under the reasoning and result of Edmond,
law enforcement is prohibited from using ShotSpotters unless officers have reasons for
individualized suspicion.
Spending more money on ineffective ShotSpotters placed in “high crime” neighborhoods across America is not the answer to reducing gun violence. As seen with Oakland’s
successful Ceasefire program, there are innovative ways to simultaneously build trust in
communities and curb gun violence. Indeed, properly designed group violence reduction
strategies will foster and maintain dignity for participants in a program tailored to saves
lives and promote community healing.

* The author is a litigation attorney with the San Jose City Attorney’s Office. He previously
served as an attorney with the Office of the Federal Public Defender in Las Vegas and Pittsburgh,
the Federal Defenders of the Middle District of Georgia, and the Office of the Colorado State Public
Defender. B.A., Sonoma State University; J.D., St. Mary’s School of Law; LL.M., The George Washington Law School. The author thanks the editors at the Michigan Journal of Law Reform, including Bryan Borodkin, Daniel Byrne, Amy O’Connell, Dana Florczak, Peter Hardin, Elaine Hartman,
Ronica Hutchison, Sari Lerner, and Wesley Ward. The views expressed in this Article are solely of
the author. The author also thanks the JLR for the invitation to participate in the 2022 Symposium:
Reimagining Police Surveillance: Protecting Activism and Ending Technologies of Oppression.

767

768

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 55:4

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................768
I. SHOTSPOTTER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY ......................... 771
A. ShotSpotter Begins .................................................... 771
1. Accolades: Brief Survey of Three Cities Using
ShotSpotter......................................................772
2. Pushback: Criticism of ShotSpotter Inaccuracy,
Misuse, and Financial Costs................................. 774
3. Reaching a New Low: Police Misconduct and
Altering ShotSpotter Reports in the Prosecution of
Silvon Simmons ................................................ 781
B. Applying the Law: Growing Fourth Amendment Concerns About
the Functionality of ShotSpotter Surveillance Technology........783
1. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond: The State Interest in
Preventing Crime Generally Without a Specific
Purpose, Violates the Fourth Amendment...............786
2. Comparing ShotSpotters to Pole Cameras: Towards
a New Analysis of Invasive Police Spying Tools ........ 791
II. TESTING TERRY'S LIMITS WITH GUNSHOTS IN 2020 AND
BEYOND: AN EMERGING CIRCUIT SPLIT ................................795
A. Terry v. Ohio ........................................................... 795
B. Seventh Circuit: Totality of the Circumstances Provided
Reasonable Suspicion for Police to Stop the Car.................... 797
C. D.C. Circuit: Police Lacked Reasonable Suspicion to Justify
Stops After New Year's Eve Celebratory Gunfire .................. 800
D. Fourth Circuit: A Gunshot Sound Is Not An Emergency
Exigent Circumstance Near Government Subsidized
Housing Developments............................................... 802
III. RACIALIZED POLICING, AND REFORMING STOP AND FRISK
TOWARDS LASTING COMMUNITY-BASED SOLUTIONS............... 806
CONCLUSION........................................................................... 811
INTRODUCTION
Consider this: on New Year’s Eve 2021, 26-year-old Nate was walking alone down an almost empty street in Bayview, San Francisco when
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two police officers drove alongside him in their cruiser. One officer
said, “I need to talk to you for a second, you need to stop.” Unbeknownst to Nate, the officers were responding to a ShotSpotter detection alert indicating that two gunshots were heard in the area just
minutes before. The officers noticed that Nate kept his left hand in the
pocket of his puffy jacket. They asked him to take his hand out, and a
subsequent pat-down search turned up a Glock 19. Nate’s public defender later found out in discovery that the ShotSpotter sensors recorded the sound of M-80 fireworks, not gunshots. However, none of this
mattered. Even though the officers had no reasonable suspicion that
Nate had committed or was about to commit a crime, Nate was charged
with felony gun possession.
In the past few years, many young, Black men like Nate have been
arrested or harassed because they have had the misfortune of being in
an area where gunshots were allegedly heard. This injustice is the result
of ShotSpotter technology, a rapid identification and response system
used in ninety American cities 1 that is designed to detect gunshots and
dispatch police. ShotSpotter is one of many powerful surveillance
tools—including Stingray cell-site simulators that track the location of
cell-phone users in real-time, facial recognition technology, and closedcircuit television cameras—used by local police departments with little
oversight. These technologies purportedly help police fight crime, but
they often do so at the expense of infringing upon privacy rights. In discussions about the efficacy of these predictive policing technologies and
efforts to regulate them, ShotSpotter has received the least attention.
This Article expands the conversation about ShotSpotter technology
considerably by examining the adjacent Fourth Amendment issues emanating from its use. For example, law enforcement increasingly relies
on ShotSpotter to create reasonable suspicion where it does not exist. 2
Oftentimes, ShotSpotter gives courts a reason to defer to police judgment and practices where initial detentions are brief and police officers’
hunches prove to be correct. This was the case in United States v. Rickmon, 3 where a divided Seventh Circuit panel ruled that the sound of
gunfire created an “emergency” that justified stopping a “suspect[‘s]”
car. This Article uses Rickmon and recent cases from the D.C. and
1. ShotSpotter is used in ninety U.S. cities, including, Miami Gardens, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Oakland, San Francisco, and Washington. See ShotSpotter Frequently Asked Questions, SHOTSPOTTER, https://www.shotspotter.com/system/content-uploads/ShotSpotter_FAQ_June_2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TW6A-SUL8] (June 2017); Chris Weller, There’s a Secret Technology in 90 US Cities
That Listens For Gunfire 24/7, BUS. INSIDER (June 27, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/theressecret-technology-90-us-145900618.html [https://perma.cc/ZR6E-P3Z5].
2. See discussion infra Section I.A.ii.
3. 952 F.3d 876, 881–83 (7th Cir. 2020).
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Fourth Circuits as a foundation to argue that officers arriving on the
scene to investigate a gunshot sound they were alerted of via ShotSpotter technology should not be allowed to use the gunshot sound as the
basis of reasonable suspicion and subsequent search and seizure.
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I begins with a summary of the origins of ShotSpotter technology and describes its growing
adoption by police departments nationwide. It analyzes common
Fourth Amendment concerns implicated by ShotSpotter, and closely
examines recent analysis showing that, while there is no evidence that
ShotSpotter reduces crime, there is ample evidence that ShotSpotter is
an unreliable technology that increases police deployments and the likelihood that people are wrongfully arrested, detained, or worse. More
recently, the City of Chicago Office of Inspector General released its
own report, which found that ShotSpotter alerts are unreliable and contribute to wrongful stop-and-frisks by the police in already over-policed
Black communities.4 This Part also draws an analogy between roadblocks created by police to combat crime generally and ShotSpotter’s
gun detection technology, which has been purchased by police departments to reduce gun violence. While there is informative, extant literature simultaneously about why courts should approve of the continued
use of ShotSpotter and the need for federal and state legislatures to
regulate gunshot detection technology, less attention has been focused
on ShotSpotter’s infringement upon Fourth Amendment protections,
or the applicability of City of Indianapolis v. Edmond 5 in assessing this potential infringement. Here, I argue that the use of ShotSpotter technology is unconstitutional under Edmond because it is not used for a specific law enforcement purpose beyond preventing crime generally. Part II
analyzes how law enforcement routinely exploit stop and frisks to create an occupied police state. This Part begins with a summary of the
Terry v. Ohio doctrine and its reasonable belief requirement, then proceeds to examine an emerging jurisdictional split in the Fourth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits on the Fourth Amendment exigent circumstances exception. Part III examines how racialized policing and the
legal system function to facilitate the status quo of violence and bias
against Black Americans. This Part concludes with offering prescriptive
ideas for reducing gun violence in over-policed communities of color
that do not involve ShotSpotter. It considers the divergent approaches
taken by major cities such as Oakland and Chicago to address gun vio-

4. CITY OF CHI. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT’S USE OF SHOTSPOTTER TECHNOLOGY (2021).
5. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
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lence, including innovative reform plans to build trust in communities
and curb the continual increase in gun violence.
I. SHOTSPOTTER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY

A. ShotSpotter Begins
In 1996, Palo Alto physicist Robert Showen, concerned with growing
gun violence in urban America, created ShotSpotter to help communities where gunshots often go unreported. 6 His idea was that the science
and technologies used to detect earthquakes could also be used to register gunshots. 7 Showen’s innovative idea eventually evolved into
ShotSpotter’s current iteration: a cloud-based technological system that
covers a geographic area with microphones and software to actively
monitor for the sound of gunshots. 8 The system consists of a network of
twenty to twenty-five powerful sensors per square mile placed to detect
the location of a shooting by triangulation. 9 These white, diamond-like
sensors contain “microphone[s], GPS for clock data, memory and processing, and have the cell capability to transmit data” and pinpoint the
exact location of a gunshot. 10 Typically, ShotSpotter sensors are placed
on rooftops and traffic light poles as low as twenty feet above the
ground, and immediately alert law enforcement when a gunshot is registered. Based on the ShotSpotter’s algorithm, the microphones suppress ambient noises and are triggered only by impulsive noises such as
“booms” and “bangs.” The system can also pinpoint the location of the
gunshot. 11

6. See Jay Stanley, Gunshot Detectors: the ACLU’s View, ACLU (May 29, 2012, 3:37 PM), https://
www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/gunshot-detectors-aclus-view
[https://perma.cc/9MZ6-SUV5]; Katherine Kornei, Physicist Pinpoints Urban Gunfire, APS PHYSICS:
APS NEWS (June 2018), https://www.aps.org/publications/apsnews/201806/gunfire.cfm [https:/
/perma.cc/NRF7-WSPP].
7. See Josh Sanburn, Shots Fired, TIME (Oct. 2, 2017) https://time.com/4951192/shots-firedshotspotter/ [https://perma.cc/4CVL-DFFJ]; see Kornei, supra note 6.
8. See Stanley, supra note 6.
9. See Jay Stanley, ShotSpotter CEO Answers Questions on Gunshot Detectors in Cities, ACLU
(May 5, 2015, 9:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies
/shotspotter-ceo-answers-questions-gunshot [https://perma.cc/W886-GURL]; Benjamin Goodman, ShotSpotter – The New Tool to Degrade What is Left of the Fourth Amendment, 54 UIC L. REV. 797,
800 (2021).
10. Stanley, supra note 9.
11. Id.
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ShotSpotter begins recording one second before the triggering
sound and stops one second afterwards. 12 An alert is sent to a 24-hour
monitoring center in Newark, California, or in ShotSpotter’s new
Washington, D.C. office where trained acoustic experts determine the
origin of the audio and whether the sound is gunfire. 13 Local police then
receive alerts via their smartphones or by dispatch, often within thirty
to forty-five seconds. 14 ShotSpotter is used in ninety U.S. cities, including Boston, Miami Gardens, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Oakland, San
Francisco, and Washington, D.C. 15 ShotSpotter charges law enforcement agencies subscription fees ranging from $65,000 to $80,000 per
square mile, per year for sensors installed in undisclosed locations. 16
1. Accolades: Brief Survey of Three Cities Using ShotSpotter
Police departments in San Francisco, Oakland, and New York use
ShotSpotter. 17 San Francisco, one of ShotSpotter’s earliest users since
2008, placed sensors in its Western Addition, Bayview and Mission
communities, which are three of San Francisco’s highest crime neighborhoods. 18 In 2010, the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) added
sensors in Visitacion Valley, expanding its ShotSpotter network from
3.3 square miles to four square miles. 19 In 2014, more sensors were

12. See Gabriel Sandoval & Rachel Holiday, ‘ShotSpotter’ Tested as Shootings and Fireworks Soar,
While Civil Rights Questions, CITY (July 5, 2020, 3:53 PM), https://www.thecity.nyc/2020/7/5/21312671
/shotspotter-nyc-shootings-fireworks-nypd-civil-rights [https://perma.cc/F7AV-6RU8].
13. Many of these employees are former law enforcement. See Michael Quander, Gunshot
Tracking Technology Company Opens Office in DC to Help Police Curb Crime, WUSA9 (July 14, 2021, 12:19
PM), https://www.wusa9.com/article/news/local/dc/shotspotter-technology-company-expandsoffices-to-dc/65-9a1e0121-3728-4cee-a723-78164b682ccb [https://perma.cc/2TPB-J33Z] (reporting
that ShotSpotter recently opened a new office in Washington, DC); Clarence Williams, How
ShotSpotter Locates Gunfire, Helps Police Catch Shooters and Works to ‘Denormalize’ Gun Violence, WASH.
POST (May 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2017/05/10/howshotspotter-locates-gunfire-helps-police-catch-shooters-and-denormalize-gun-violence/ [https://
perma.cc/K2CG-TQRG].
14. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 1.
15. Id.
16. Alysson Gatens & Jessica Reichert, Police Technology: Acoustic Gunshot Detection Systems, ILL.
CRIM. JUST. INFO. AUTH. (Dec. 10, 2019), https://icjia.illinois.gov/researchhub/articles/policetechnology-acoustic-gunshot-detection-systems [https://perma.cc/SJA5-BB2H].
17. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 1.
18. Jonah Owen Lamb, Courtroom Testimony Reveals Accuracy of SF Gunshot Sensor a ‘Marketing’
Ploy, S.F. EXAM’R (July 11, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.sfexaminer.com/news/courtroomtestimony-reveals-accuracy-of-sf-gunshot-sensors-a-marketing-ploy/ [https://perma.cc/56UX8DDA].
19. Id.
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placed in the three original neighborhoods. 20 This expansion coincided
with a significant 34.6 percent city-wide reduction in gunfire between
2014 and 2015, as reported by ShotSpotter themselves. 21 Yet, all of this
was mitigated by an increase in the homicide-by-gunshot rate, which
rose from 45 gunshot victims to in 2014 to 52 victims in 2015. 22 In 2020,
despite pandemic shelter-in-place orders, shootings allegedly increased
due to the escalation of pandemic-related unrest and gang-related violence. 23 ShotSpotter recorded 744 gunshots fired in the first seven
months of the year, a thirty-two percent increase from the same period
in 2019. 24
Across the bay in Oakland, ShotSpotter began service in
2010. Oakland is known as one of the most violent cities in this country. 25 One ShotSpotter study showed that its microphones detected
8,769 gunfire incidents in 2012 and 2013, but Oakland residents reported less than one-eighth of those incidents to the Oakland Police Department (OPD). 26 Today, a dozen ShotSpotters are strewn across sixteen miles of the city. 27 In 2019, ShotSpotter recorded about fifty shots
per day, and about ten of those shots were connected to real gunfire incidents. 28 The City Council of Oakland and its Privacy Advisory Commission unanimously approved the continued use of ShotSpotter in
2019. 29
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. See Megan Cassidy, Troubling Trend in S.F.: 32% Jump in Gunfire Recorded by ShotSpotter Sensors,
S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 22, 2020, 12:25 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/Troubling-trendin-San-Francisco-32-jump-in-15585017.php [https://perma.cc/AN89-GC82].
24. See id.
25. DAVID MUHAMMAD, NAT’L INST. FOR CRIM. JUST. REFORM, OAKLAND’S SUCCESSFUL GUN VIOLENCE REDUCTION STRATEGY 1 (2018) https://nicjr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/OaklandÑ
sSuccessful-Gun-Violence-Reduction-Strategy-NICJR-Jan-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5V9-ZV3P].
26. See Darwin BondGraham, ShotSpotter Lobbied Oakland Officials in Apparent Violation of Law, E.
BAY EXPRESS (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/shotspotter-lobbied-oaklandofficials-in-apparent-violation-of-law/Content?oid=3907581 [https://perma.cc/933Z-PBTZ].
27. See Police Report Stunning Rise in Gunfire on Oakland Streets, CBS News.com, July 14,
2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/sanfrancisco/news/police-report-stunning-rise-in-gunfire-onoakland-streets/.
28. Press Release, Oakland Police Dep’t, 86% of Shootings in Oakland are Unreported (July
13, 2020), https://www.oaklandca.gov/news/2020/86-of-shootings-in-oakland-are-unreported
[https://perma.cc/JA5M-6BYK]; Police Report Stunning Rise in Gunfire on Oakland Streets, CBS S.F. (July 14, 2020, 6:30 AM), https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2020/07/14/police-report-stunning-rise-ingunfire-on-oakland-streets/ [https://perma.cc/VBZ2-N52L].
29. ShotSpotter’s Gunshot Detection Technology Unanimously Passes Oakland’s Rigorous Surveillance
Ordinance, OFFICER.COM (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.officer.com/investigations/gunshot-locationsystems/press-release/21116653/shotspotter-shotspotters-gunshot-detection-technology-unanimouslypasses-oaklands-rigorous-surveillance-ordinance [https://perma.cc/7S32-L6GP]. See generally,
Jason Tashea, Gunshot Detection Technology Company Voluntarily Submitted Itself for an Audit After Priva-
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ShotSpotter’s biggest contract by far is with the New York Police
Department (NYPD). In 2016, ShotSpotter operated in eight precincts
in the Bronx and ten precincts in Brooklyn. 30 Currently, ShotSpotter
monitors seventy square miles in New York City under a $28 million
five-year contract. 31 The New York Police Department believed that
ShotSpotter was necessary because around 75 percent of shots captured
by ShotSpotter technology were not reported to local police through a
911 call. 32 ShotSpotter supporters include former Mayor Bill de Blasio
and former Police Commissioner William J. Bratton (a former member
of the ShotSpotter board of directors), who insist that ShotSpotter improves the relationship between the police and the communities they
serve to protect. 33
2. Pushback: Criticism of ShotSpotter Inaccuracy,
Misuse, and Financial Costs
Any praise for ShotSpotter must be balanced with consideration of
the problems associated with gunshot detection technology. ShotSpotter gunshot detection technology in particular is often criticized for its
inaccuracy rate, misuse, and financial costs. First, despite the touting
of ShotSpotter as an important tool in reducing gun violence and its
decades-long track record as such, it remains unclear whether the technology has actually diminished rates of crime or helped solve crimes.
ShotSpotter’s inaccuracy, however, is clearer. There have been many
false positive alerts, in which there is a gunshot recorded with no corroborating evidence of any gunshot. 34 A 2013 investigation of ShotSpotter’s efficacy in Newark, New Jersey revealed that from 2010 to 2013,
seventy-five percent of the 3,632 gunshot alerts issued were false
cy Concerns, ABA JOURNAL (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/amidprivacy-concerns-a-gunshot-detection-technology-company-voluntarily-submitted-itself-for-anauditand-reaped-the-benefits [https://perma.cc/K74L-JAPF].
30. ShotSpotter, When Will 120th Precinct Get ShotSpotter, the GunFire-Tracking Tech? https://
www.shotspotter.com/news/when-will-120th-precinct-get-shotspotter-the-gunfire-tracking-tech/.
31. See Sandoval & Holiday, supra note 12.
32. See Tatiana Schlossberg, New York Police Begin Using ShotSpotter System to Detect Gunshots,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/17/nyregion/shotspotter-detectionsystem-pinpoints-gunshot-locations-and-sends-data-to-the-police.html [https://perma.cc/86H535SA].
33. See Jackson Mote, Opinion, ShotSpotter-An Advanced Shot at Crime Prevention, DEPAUW (Mar.
16, 2015), https://thedepauw.com/opinion-shotspotter-an-advanced-shot-at-crime-prevention/
[perma.cc/SMY8-A348].
34. See Matthew Guariglia, It’s Time for Police to Stop Using ShotSpotter, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.
(July 29, 2021), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/07/its-time-police-stop-using-shotspotter
[https://perma.cc/R2XG-4ARE].
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alarms. 35 A 2016 report published by the Center for Investigative Reporting also showed that almost a quarter of the time in the preceding
two years, about two-thirds of ShotSpotter alerts did not turn up evidence of gunshots. 36 The San Diego Police Department has had a similar experience over the past four years; seventy-two of their 584
ShotSpotter activations were considered “unfounded.” 37 While there are
plausible explanations for errors, such as the fact that ShotSpotter
regularly mistakenly categorizes environmental noises such as fireworks, car backfire, or construction work (jackhammer, a nail gun, or a
hammer) as gunfire, these mistakes have serious consequences for
those affected. 38
In addition to inaccuracy concerns, there are serious concerns that
ShotSpotter alerts give police ostensible justification to harass people.
For example, false-positive gunshots, just like any report of gunfire, can
encourage officers to arrive on the scene looking for a shooter with their
guns drawn, which could potentially escalate into a violent confrontation. Based on such concerns, in 2021 the Brighton Park Neighborhood
Council, Lucy Parsons Labs, and Organized Communities Against Deportations filed an amicus brief supporting a motion by the Cook County Public Defender challenging the scientific validity of the ShotSpotter
system’s gunfire reports.39 Those community activists claim ShotSpotter is ineffective and has a disproportionate racial impact on Black and
Latino communities, leading to over-policing of communities and
greater abuse in policing. 40 The suit references a new study by the Mac-

35. Prince Shakur, Gunshot Detection Technology Raises Concerns of Bias and Inaccuracy, CODA
(Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.codastory.com/authoritarian-tech/gun-violence-police-shotspotter/
[https://perma.cc/D6M9-QGFQ].
36. See id. The accuracy of gunshot detection technology used by San Francisco police was
questioned in an attempted murder trial of a man accused of shooting at a car full of people in
2016. Paul Greene, a forensic analyst with ShotSpotter and an expert witness, testified that
ShotSpotter guarantees accuracy 80 percent of the time. Greene said that the gunshot detection
system used by the San Francisco Police Department has not been recalibrated in almost a decade
and that ShotSpotter’s accuracy rate was created by the company’s sales and marketing team. See
Lamb, supra note 18.
37. See Lyndsay Winkley, San Diego Piece to Continue Using Gunshot Detection System, Despite Some
Criticism, SAN DIEGO TRIB. (Oct. 7, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news
/public-safety/sd-me-sdpd-shotspotter-20171005-story.html [https://perma.cc/TWK9-F7CF]; Kara
Grant, ShotSpotter Sensors Send SDPD Officers to False Alarms More Often Than Advertised, VOICES OF SAN
DIEGO (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/public-safety/shotspotter-sensorssend-sdpd-officers-to-false-alarms-more-often-than-advertised/ [https://perma.cc/L5ZN-N7M9].
38. See Sandoval & Holiday, supra note 12; Gatens & Reichert, supra note 16.
39. See Brief for Brighton Park Neighborhood Council, et.al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Frye Hearing, Illinois v. Williams, 20 CR 0899601 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2021).
40. See Press Release, MacArthur Just. Ctr., ShotSpotter Generated Over 40,000 Dead-End
Police Deployments in Chicago in 21 Months, According to New Study (May 3, 2021), https://

776

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 55:4

Arthur Justice Center at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law that
claims that the Chicago Police Department’s use of ShotSpotter technology is inaccurate, expensive, and dangerous. 41 The study was designed to test the veracity of ShotSpotter’s claims of accuracy and explore the impact of the ShotSpotter system on Chicago’s marginalized
communities.42 According to Jonathan Manes, an attorney with the
MacArthur Justice Center,
[s]urveillance technology has a veneer of objectivity, but many
of these systems do not work as advertised . . . [h]igh tech tools
can create a false justification for the broken status quo of policing and can end up exacerbating existing racial disparities.
We needed to know whether this system actually does what it
claims to do. It does not. 43
The study itself is a rejoinder to ShotSpotter’s unsubstantiated claims
that its technology is 97% accurate. 44 The MacArthur Justice Center, via
the Illinois Freedom of Information Act, secured data on ShotSpotter
deployments from July 1, 2019 through April 14, 2021. 45 The data showed
that “89% [of deployments] turned up no gun-related crime, 86% led to
no report of any crime at all,” and that more than 40,000 ShotSpotter
deployments ran into dead ends entirely. 46 Since ShotSpotter sensors
are installed only in the Chicago police districts with the highest proportion of Black and Latino residents, ShotSpotter exacerbates discriminatory policing patterns already deployed within these neighborhoods. 47
Such discriminatory policing patterns received national media attention in the Spring of 2021 when a ShotSpotter alert summoned Chicago Police Officer Eric Stillman to a scene where he subsequently shot
www.macarthurjustice.org/shotspotter-generated-over-40000-dead-end-police-deployments-inchicago-in-21-months-according-to-new-study/ [https://perma.cc/VD6Q-V36B].
41. See id.
42. End Police Surveillance: ShotSpotter Creates Thousands of Dead-End Police Deployments That Find
No Evidence of Actual Gunfire, MACARTHUR JUST. CTR. (last visited June 11, 2022), https://endpolices
urveillance.com/ [perma.cc/KD3Z-JHL6].
43. Press Release, MacArthur Just. Ctr., supra note 40.
44. See Patrick Elwood, Community Groups Demand City Oust ShotSpotter Gunshot Detection System, WGNTV.com (July 30, 2021, 6:31 PM), https://wgntv.com/news/community-groups-demandcity-oust-shotspotter-gunshot-detection-system [https://perma.cc/5WNT-L3DJ].
45. Press Release, MacArthur Just. Ctr., supra note 40.
46. Id.
47. Brief for Brighton Park Neighborhood Council, supra note 39, at 21; see Groups Say Chicago
Detection Systems Unreliable, Seek Review, NBC CHI. (May 3, 2021, 4:34 PM), https://www.nbcchicago
.com/news/local/groups-say-chicago-gunshot-detection-systems-unreliable-seek-review/2501165/
[https://perma.cc/U3P6-42CV]; Goodman, supra note 9, at 802.
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and killed 13-year-old Adam Toledo. 48 As shown in officer body camera
footage, Toledo dropped a gun and lifted his empty hands in the air
moments before Officer Stillman shot him. 49 Ruben Roman, a twentyone year old, was later charged with firing his gun at a passing car,
which prompted the ShotSpotter alert; Toledo was shot when he and
Roman allegedly ran away from police. 50 Toledo’s death sparked a protest march against police violence and drove community activists to
demand that the City of Chicago end its use of ShotSpotter technology. 51 Their concerns are understandable given that:
African American and Latinx individuals are overrepresented
among Chicago’s shooting and domestic violence victims. African Americans make up 80 percent of the city’s shooting victims and Latinx individuals make up 17 percent of all shooting
victims as compared to Whites who make up approximately 2
percent of victims. 52
To be sure, Chicago’s use of ShotSpotter reinforces existing racial
inequities in a city with a history of discriminatory patterns of policing,
especially stop-and-frisk. 53 Anticipating more wrongful arrests, detentions, and other harms caused by police deployments, Jonathan Manes
remarked, “[t]he ShotSpotter system in Chicago prompts thousands of
deployments by police hunting for gunfire in vain . . . [i]t creates a
powder keg situation for residents who just happen to be in the vicinity
of a false alert.” 54 Despite this reality, Chicago’s police chief, Eddie

48. Freddy Martinez & Lucy Parsons Labs, Surveillance Technologies Are Destroying Lives in Chicago, SOUTHSIDE WEEKLY (Apr. 28, 2021), https://southsideweekly.com/end-the-citys-shotspottercontrac/t [https://perma.cc/LW5R-LPJ6]; see David K. Li, Video of Fatal Shooting of 13-Year-Old Adam
Toledo Released, NBC NEWS (Apr. 15, 2021, 11:09 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news
/video-fatal-chicago-police-shooting-13-year-old-adam-toledo-n1264172 [https://perma.cc/2EL4DC8P]; Joe Berkowtiz, Violent Crime is Up. Expanding the Surveillance State is Not the Solution, FASTCOMPANY (July 30, 2021), https://www.fastcompany.com/90659445/violent-crime-is-up-expandingthe-surveillance-state-is-not-the-solution [https://perma.cc/6W4V-EZE2].
49. See Carlos Ballesteros, In Little Village, Adam Toledo’s Death Spurs Reflection on Police, Gangs,
and Race, INJUSTICEWATCH (Apr. 23, 2021), https://www.injusticewatch.org/news/police-andprosecutors/2021/adam-toledo-little-village-police-gangs/ [https://perma.cc/8FNA-QDB9].
50. See Elwood, supra note 44.
51. See id.
52. CITY OF CHI., OUR CITY, OUR SAFETY: A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO REDUCE VIOLENCE IN CHICAGO (2020). https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/sites/public-safety-and-violenc-reduction
/pdfs/OurCityOurSafety.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y3TD-6V95].
53. See Brief for Brighton Park Neighborhood Council, supra note 39, at 3, 16.
54. Elwood, supra note 44.
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Johnson has praised ShotSpotter. 55 Mayor Lori Lightfoot also sees
ShotSpotter technology as an important part of the city’s overall crime
detection system. 56
The MacArthur Justice Center Study further argues that ShotSpotter provides a false technological justification for over-policing, and encourages increased, racialized patterns of policing in Chicago that have
resulted in community distrust. 57 In its report, the MacArthur Justice
Center concluded that lumping false and accurate ShotSpotter alerts
together inflates a false and distorted perception of gun violence in predominantly minority neighborhoods. 58 In response, ShotSpotter responded with its own report, claiming that “[t]he MacArthur Justice
Center Report draws erroneous conclusions from researchers’ interpretation of police report categorizations, falsely equating them with no
shots fired…911 call center data alone provides an incomplete and misleading picture of ShotSpotter’s accuracy and effectiveness.” 59
The City of Chicago Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) Office has
also released a report on the Chicago Police Department’s use of
ShotSpotter gunshot detection technology (“Report”) that corroborates
finding by the MacArthur Justice Center. The OIG analyzed data from
50,176 ShotSpotter alerts between January 1, 2020 and May 31, 2021. 60
The Report concluded that the Chicago Police Department’s responses
to ShotSpotter alerts rarely produced evidence of a gun-related crime,
and rarely rose to investigatory stops, suggesting that the detection system is unreliable. 61 Specifically, the vast majority of ShotSpotter alerts
were unconnected to any shooting incident, and only nine percent of
ShotSpotter alerts indicated evidence of a gun-related criminal offense. 62 Furthermore, only two percent of all ShotSpotter alerts resulted
in officer-written investigatory stop reports.63
55. See JON FASMAN, WE SEE IT ALL: LIBERTY AND JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF PERPETUAL SURVEILLANCE
56 (2021).
56. See Groups Say Chicago Detection Systems Unreliable, Seek Review, supra note 47; Megan Hickey, ShotSpotter Gunshot Detection Technology Has Become a Crucial Police Tool in Chicago, But Is It Worth
the $33 Million the City is Paying, CBS CHI. (May 3, 2021, 10:21 PM), https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2021
/05/03/shotspotter-chicago-police-contract-questions/ [http://perma.cc/JDE3-TW6E].
57. Brief for Brighton Park Neighborhood Council, supra note 39, at 19–21.
58. Id. at 30.
59. Abbie Alford, Decision on ShotSpotter Contract Delayed in San Diego, CBS8 (July 27, 2021,
10:33 PM), https://www.cbs8.com/article/news/crime/decision-on-shotspotter-contract-delayedin-san-diego-gunfire-detection-system-city-council-police-tool/509-dc7b0c82-7c82-40c5-bf0e0007fafd87bd [https://perma.cc/USG4-7TKM].
60. CITY OF CHI. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT’S USE OF SHOTSPOTTER TECHNOLOGY at 2–3, 15 (2021).
61. See id. at 2–3, 22.
62. Id. at 3.
63. Id. at 16.
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Equally damning was the Report’s finding that ShotSpotter contributes to wrongful stop-and-frisks. The Report suggested that the reliance on ShotSpotter technology gives Chicago Police officers an additional rationale to conduct stop-and-frisks in already over-policed areas
where Black residents live, such as South Chicago and Calumet where
these alerts are concentrated. 64 In areas where ShotSpotter alerts are
most frequent, officers are more inclined to find reasonable suspicion
that a person was involved in a gun-related crime. 65 This assertion is
supported by the defined pattern of police conducting stop-and-frisks
based on proximity to an aggregate number of past alerts in a specific
area—which purportedly establishes police justification for stopping
and searching a person. Commenting on the MacArthur Justice Center
study and the OIG report, Jay Stanley with the ACLU Speech, Privacy,
and Technology Project explains that “[t]he placement of sensors in
some neighborhoods but not others means that the police will detect
more incidents (real or false) in places where the sensors are located.
That can distort gunfire statistics and create a circular statistical jurisdiction for over-policing in communities of color.” 66 Likewise, the Electronic Frontier Foundation is critical of ShotSpotter technology and refers to specific cases highlighted in the OIG Report to demonstrate that
“aggregate ShotSpotter data, used as a blank check for stop and searches, erodes civil liberties and the presumption of innocence.” 67 Notwithstanding the OIG’s scathing report, a spokesperson for ShotSpotter insisted their technology is accurate:
It is important to point out that the Chicago Police Department
continually describes ShotSpotter as an important part of their
operations. The OIG report does not negatively reflect on
ShotSpotter’s accuracy which has been independently audited
at 97 percent based on feedback from more than 120 customers.
Nor does the OIG propose that ShotSpotter alerts are not indic-

64. See id. at 13, 19.
65. See id. at 19.
66. Jay Stanley, Four Problems with the ShotSpotter Gun Detection System, ACLU (Aug. 24, 2021),
https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/four-problems-with-the-shotspotter-gunshotdetection-system/ [https://perma.cc/W886-GURL].
67. Matthew Guariglia & Adam Schwartz, Chicago Inspector General: Using ShotSpotter Does
Not Justify Crime Fighting Utility, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 24, 2021), https://www.eff.org/deep
links/2021/08/chicago-inspector-general-police-use-shotspotter-justify-illegal-stop-and-frisks
[https://perma.cc/R2XG-4ARE].
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ative of actual gunfire whether or not physical evidence is recovered. 68
The issues highlighted in the OIG’s report are not exclusive to Chicago. Last year, NYPD officers responding to ShotSpotter alerts fatally
shot a gunman in a Crown Heights housing project, and another
ShotSpotter alert sent officers into a violent altercation with a crowd in
Harlem. 69 Likewise, people might be charged with something other
than gun-related offenses because they are the first people that the police encounter in the area where ShotSpotter has recorded a gunshot.
This happened when several undercover NYPD officers responded to a
ShotSpotter alert in Canarsie and came across two young men allegedly
smoking marijuana. 70 The police officers then swarmed one of the men,
repeatedly punching and kicking him for “resisting arrest” while onlookers screamed and took video footage. 71 This example is illustrative
of what is all too common: officers using ShotSpotter data as a pretext
to arrest and harass citizens who are not involved in the officers’ original purposes for arriving on the scene.
These kinds of incidents spurred concerns for the Center for the
Constitutional Rights (CCR). Before ShotSpotter’s implementation period, CCR criticized the NYPD ShotSpotter Impact and Use Policy due
to concern about the potential of increased surveillance of Black and
Latinx communities by placing ShotSpotter sensors in a “high crime area” resulting in discriminatory enforcement against persons of color.72
CCR called for more transparency in the Impact and Use Policy so that
New Yorkers will know about the inaccuracy and ineffectiveness of
ShotSpotter technology, and the locations where ShotSpotters are installed. 73 Additionally, CCR wants the NYPD to publicly report on
ShotSpotter errors and enforcement outcomes, and for the NYPD to
seek out input from communities that are policed by ShotSpotters. 74
Further, victims of police violence face many hurdles in seeking justice when wrongfully harmed by ShotSpotter technology. As CCR

68. Aldermen Seek Public Hearing on Questions About Accuracy of Police ShotSpotter Technology, CBS
CHI. (Sept. 14, 2021, 10:33 PM), https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2021/09/14/aldermen-public-hearingshotspotter-technology-accuracy/ [https://perma.cc/PBB7-SL8C].
69. Sandoval & Holiday, supra note 12.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Open Letter from Ctr. for Const. Rts., Re: Comments on NYPD ShotSpotter Impact and
Use Policy, 1 (Feb. 25, 2021), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2021/02/Shot%20Spotter
%20Comments%20CCR%20BLH%202-25-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZEL-UVSN].
73. Id. at 2.
74. Id. at 2–3, 5.
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pointed out, one these hurdles is ShotSpotter’s lack of transparency.
The company closely protects its trade secrets by retaining all propriety
interests in ShotSpotter data, including sensor-captured shots and audio. 75
Remarkably, ShotSpotter may not make financial sense for the police, especially given that police departments across the country have
grown increasingly concerned about the actual impact that ShotSpotter
has on decreasing gunfire or violence, which has led some departments
to discontinue their contracts with ShotSpotter. In 2016, the CharlotteMecklenburg Police Department in North Carolina declined to renew
its annual ShotSpotter contract because the program was unhelpful in
making arrests or identifying victims.76 A year later, the San Antonio
Police Department cut funding to what was a $550,000 investment in
ShotSpotter because it had resulted in only four arrests. 77
3. Reaching a New Low: Police Misconduct and Altering ShotSpotter
Reports in the Prosecution of Silvon Simmons
The prosecution of Silvon Simmons in Rochester, New York
demonstrates how ShotSpotter reports can be manipulated. In this
case, the State accused Simmons of firing the first shot during an altercation with police and charged him with attempted murder of a police
officer. 78 Simmons, who is a Black man, instead claimed that he was exiting his friend’s Chevrolet Impala in a driveway when a bright spotlight
was shone in his face and a person began approaching him with a gun
drawn. 79 Because the officer—Officer Ferrigno—at no point identified
himself, Simmons was unaware that the man was a Rochester police officer and began running towards his home in fear. 80 Simmons was almost over the small fence leading to his duplex’s backyard when he was
shot three times in his back, left buttock, and right upper leg by Officer
Ferrigno. 81

75.
76.
77.

See Goodman, supra note 9, at 802; see Stanley, supra note 9.
Lamb, supra note 18.
See Vianna Davilla, S.A. Police Cut Pricey Gunshot Detection System, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESSNEWS (Aug. 17, 2017, 9:12 AM), https://www.expressnews.com/news/local/article/San-Antoniopolice-cut-pricey-gunshot-detection-11824797.php [https://perma.cc/3RWP-DZDT].
78. Shakur, supra note 35.
79. See id.
80. Amended Complaint and Jury Demand ¶ 75, Simmons v. Ferrigno, No. 6:17-CV-06176
MAT (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2018), ECF No. 1
81. Id. ¶¶ 86–87; People v. Simmons, 57 Misc.3d 1212(A), slip op. at *2 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Apr. 13,
2017).
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At trial, Officer Ferrigno testified that he saw what could have been
the silver or gray Chevrolet Impala depicted in a Rochester Police Department (RPD) “wanted board” belonging to a Black man suspected of
threatening a woman with a gun a few days earlier. 82 Ferrigno testified
that he arrived at the driveway where the Impala was parked first, identified himself, and then chased Simmons, at which point Simmons shot
at him and ran away. 83 However, the trial judge determined that Ferrigno did not have reasonable suspicion that Simmons had committed,
or was about to commit, a crime and therefore no pursuit was warranted. 84
The remaining issue surrounded who shot who first. The prosecution claimed that after Simmons shot at Ferrigno, the officer returned
fire four times. 85 In contrast, the defense claimed that Simmons was
unarmed and Ferrigno fired four shots at him without cause. 86 The civil
complaint, based largely on the findings from the criminal trial, summarized that the defense offered the testimony of a neighbor who asserted that she heard four gunshots, while the prosecution hinged their
case on a ShotSpotter report showing that five shots were fired. 87 The
defense, however, called the reliability of the ShotSpotter evidence into
question. 88 A forensic analyst and expert witness with ShotSpotter testified that ShotSpotter audio files can be altered by ShotSpotter employees or police after they are originally recorded. 89 In this case,
ShotSpotter forensic evidence showed that the data had been altered
twice by the time it was entered into evidence. Initially ShotSpotter
mistook the loud noises in Simmons’ neighborhood as the sound of a
helicopter overhead, until Rochester police notified ShotSpotter via
email that an officer-involved shooting had taken place. 90 The report,
which kept changing, first relayed that three shots had been fired, but
was later modified to show that four shots were fired. 91 The Rochester
Police Department then informed ShotSpotter of Ferrigno’s account of
the altercation and requested that they look for more shots. 92 Five days
82. See Simmons, 57 Misc.3d 1212(A), at *2.
83. Id., at *2.
84. Id., at *9.
85. Id., at *6.
86. Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 80, at ¶¶ 86–88.
87. Id. ¶¶ 86–136; see also Reade Levinson & Lisa Girion, A Black Man Risks All to Clear His Name
– And Expose the Police, REUTERS (Nov. 17, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates
/special-report/usa-police-rochester-trial [https://perma.cc/NA5M-4FFZ].
88. See Levinson & Girion, supra note 87.
89. See Shakur, supra note 35.
90. See Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 80, ¶ 239.
91. Id. ¶ 232.
92. Id. ¶¶ 236–42.
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later, ShotSpotter employees amended the original forensic report to
reflect that five shots had been fired, matching Officer Ferrigno’s testimony. 93At the trial’s conclusion, Simmons was acquitted of all charges
except criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, which
was later reversed and set aside by the court. 94
B. Applying the Law: Growing Fourth Amendment Concerns About the
Functionality of ShotSpotter Surveillance Technology
There has been ongoing, robust debate among legal scholars about
whether police use of surveillance technology like ShotSpotter is a good
idea. In Smart Surveillance: How to Interpret the Fourth Amendment in the
Twenty-First Century, Ric Simmons enthusiastically embraces the view
that surveillance technologies prevent crime, help catch criminals,
monitor police conduct, and reduce racial profiling. 95 Simmons suggests that big data is revolutionizing criminal investigation and has the
potential to dramatically increase the productivity of surveillance. 96 In
contrast, in The Rise of Big Data Policing: Surveillance, Race, and the Future of
Law Enforcement, Andrew Guthrie Ferguson cautions that big datadriven policing often results in an aggressive police presence, oversurveillance, and perceived harassment in communities of color. 97 Additionally, Ferguson argues, big data targeting can distort and lower the
reasonable suspicion requirement for stop-and-frisks for reasons correlated with race and class, which creates a never-ending circle of racial
93. Other evidence introduced at trial was equally dubious. Ferrigno and Officer Giancursio—another officer at the scene—gave chase without activating their patrol car lights and limited
their radio communications with each other using a secure channel radio, and they did not run a
check of the Impala’s plates. Officers failed to locate a bullet from the found gun, despite canvasing
the neighborhood. The DNA evidence on the gun did not match Simmons’ DNA. The gun had an
empty magazine, but it was not in a cocked-back position as guns should be after being fired. The
police never tested Simmons’ clothes and hands for gunpowder residue. Neither Ferrigno nor
Giancursio alerted dispatch about chasing a possible gunman. See Levinson & Girion, supra note
87.
94. See Sandoval & Holiday, supra note 12. Simmons was released after spending 18 months in
jail, and he filed suit against ShotSpotter, the police officers involved, and the City of Rochester for
illegal search and seizure, falsely arrested, use of excessive and deadly force, fabricated and falsified evidence, maliciously prosecution and denial of fair trial. See Amended Complaint and Jury
Demand, supra note 80. The charges of resisting arrest, obstruction, and possession of marijuana
against him were dropped as Simmons was preparing his civil action. See Sandoval & Holiday, supra note 12.
95. RIC SIMMONS, SMART SURVEILLANCE: HOW TO INTERPRET THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 10, 71 (2019).
96. See id. at 142.
97. ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND
THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (2017).
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profiling. 98 He explains further that, relying on racially skewed databases, police may look at individuals living in high-crime areas or who
have repeated contacts with police and place them in targeted databases
and on community watch lists. 99
Ferguson’s concerns reflect the view of many others that the use of
ShotSpotter may violate the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation cautions that gunshot detection
systems can potentially record human voices and capture social conversations. 100 Courts have addressed these constitutional tensions in cases
where ShotSpotter recorded the dying words of men involved in police
shootings. In such instances, courts must determine whether
ShotSpotter evidence may be admissible based on its reliability. 101 Citing these examples, some scholars have already investigated how privacy concerns might square up against admissibility of ShotSpotter recordings as evidence, and concluded that concerns about privacy
infringement are outweighed by the value of ShotSpotter as an effective
crime fighting tool. 102 One author pointed to the decreased rate of gunshots due to ShotSpotter, and concluded that their use does not violate
an individual’s expectation of privacy. 103 Another author applied the analytical frameworks offered by Katz v. United States, 104 Kyllo v. United
98. Id. at 57.
99. Id.
100. Acoustic Gunshot Detection, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/pages/gunshotdetection (last visited Mar. 13, 2022) [https://perma.cc/YL9Z-GGJJ]; see also Cale Guthrie Weissman,
The NYP’s New Technology May Be Recording Conversations, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 26, 2015, 1:05 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/the-nypds-newest-technology-may-be-recording-conversations2015-3 [https://perma.cc/BZ7G-UHDX]; Is ShotSpotter Violating Your Fourth Amendment Rights and You
Don’t Even Know?, RTS. AND DISSENT (May 8, 2015), https://www.rightsanddissent.org/news/isshotspotter-violating-your-fourth-amendment-rights-and-you-dont-even-know/ [https://perma.cc
/F93E-PKC8].
101. See, e.g., State v. Hill, 851 N.W.2d 670, 691 (Neb. 2014) (finding that “[i]t was neither untenable nor unreasonable for the trial court to conclude that the absence of blind testing did not seriously undermine the reliability of the ShotSpotter system in northeast Omaha.”); Sandoval &
Holiday, supra note 12.
102. See, e.g., Amanda Busljeta, How an Acoustic Sensor Can Catch a Gunman, 32 J. MARSHALL J.
INFO. TECH. & PRIV. L. 211, 216–28 (2016).
103. See id. at 220, 225–27. One journalist suggested that police departments need to reach out to
communities that have a long history of distrust of the police and convey to them how ShotSpotter
works and its technological limits. Dave Davies, Surveillance and Local Police: How Technology Is Evolving
Faster than Regulation, WUWF (Jan. 27, 2021, 11:51 AM), https://www.wuwf.org/post/surveillance-andlocal-police-how-technology-evolving-faster-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/9FD2-HBQU] (interviewing journalist John Fasman about the privacy concerns with ShotSpotter, and how to mitigate them).
104. Katz superseded the prior Court rulings that defined “search” and “seizure” only in physical terms. Under the Katz two-prong expectation of privacy test, a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment takes place when the defendant manifests an actual expectation of privacy that
society is willing to recognize as legitimate, justifiable, or reasonable. Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 353–58 (1967).
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States, 105 and United States v. Jones 106 and concluded that the use of
ShotSpotter technology by police—not as a listening device but as datagathering technology—does not infringe upon an individual’s Fourth
Amendment rights. 107 Taken together, these authors posit that
ShotSpotter technology does not in of itself invade individual privacy
rights. However, these authors suggest that, given the lack of guidance
from Congress and state legislatures, the Supreme Court should once
and for all rule on the constitutionality of ShotSpotter technology in order to offer lower courts much needed clarity and guidance. 108
The majority of scholarship around the constitutionality of
ShotSpotter was published prior to the advent of modern technological
advances, which have led to ShotSpotter being used in novel and invasive ways. In 2019, the Policing Project at the New York University
School of Law confirmed that ShotSpotter can use and program closedcircuit TV (CCTV) cameras to turn toward the direction of an alert. 109
Additionally, the NYPD can combine the use of ShotSpotter with CCTV
or video management systems to direct cameras to other surveillance
assets and use facial recognition and facial surveillance technology,
which are the latest threats to associational privacy and personal security. 110 Meanwhile, law enforcement agencies are saying precious little
105. In Kyllo, the Court held that law enforcement’s use of a thermal imaging device aimed at a
private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat and obtain information about
the interior of a home constitutes a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court acknowledged that even though there was no physical intrusion, the government’s action was still an unreasonable warrantless “search” that presumably required a warrant. Id.
106. In Jones, a unanimous Court expressed discomfort with the government’s attachment of a
GPS tracker on a jeep over twenty-eight days, which was determined to be a “search.” United
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406–07 (2012). Justice Scalia sidestepped the issue of the application
of the Katz and instead used common-law trespass theory and concluded that the Government
trespassory inserted the information-gathering device when it encroached on Jones’ jeep—a protected area. Id. at 412.
107. Alexandra S. Gecas, Gunfire Game Changer or Big Brother’s Hidden Ears?: Fourth Amendment
and Admissibility Quandaries Relating to ShotSpotter Technology, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1073, 1077, 1104,
1108 (2016).
108. See id. at 1117.
109. THE POLICING PROJECT AT NYU SCH. OF L., PRIVACY AUDIT & ASSESSMENT OF SHOTSPOTTER,
INC.’S GUNSHOT DETECTION TECHNOLOGY 15 (2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58a33e88
1b631bc60d4f8b31/t/6065e7d81422241f592ce0e5/1617291232883/Privacy%2BAudit%2Band%2BAssessment
%2Bof%2BShotspotter%2BFlex.pdf [https://perma.cc/E87W-XND9]. It is encouraging that ShotSpotter adopted the New York University School of Law’s Policing Project’s recommendations for
strengthening ShotSpotter’s privacy protections. Id. at 4–5. But that is not enough. The Policing
Project did not offer a meaningful analysis of the effects of police use of ShotSpotter on communities of color. It only mentioned in passing that ShotSpotters can accommodate predictive policing
software and reinforce stereotypes about certain particular neighborhoods. Id. at 15.
110. See Sandoval & Holiday, supra note 12; Facial Recognition Technology: (Part I) Its Impact on our
Civil Rights and Liberties Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform, 116th Cong. 3-4 (2019) (written
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about their use of facial recognition software, even though the New
York Public Oversight Surveillance Technology Act (POST Act) compels
NYPD to explain how it uses facial recognition tools and other surveillance technologies to strategically track New Yorkers.111
These concerns are not exclusive to New York. Recently, ShotSpotter technology combined with video footage facilitated a wrongful arrest in Chicago, where a 65-year-old Black man named Michael Williams was falsely accused of killing a young man during the unrest over
police brutality in the summer of 2020. 112 The prosecution’s evidence
against Williams was a silent video clip showing his car, another car
running through a red light at an intersection, and a ShotSpotter
alert. 113 Williams, who went out to buy cigarettes that summer night,
was held in pre-trial custody for almost a year in Cook County jail before the State Attorney’s Office dismissed the case based on insufficient
evidence. 114
1. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond: The State Interest in Preventing Crime
Generally Without a Specific Purpose, Violates the Fourth Amendment
As informative as the extant literature is about why courts should
approve of the continued use of ShotSpotter and the need for federal
and state legislation that regulates gunshot detection technology, less
attention has been focused on the applicability of City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond 115 in legal analyses of ShotSpotter constitutionality. To fill that
gap, this Subsection argues that the use of ShotSpotter by law enforcement may be unconstitutional under Edmond. In Edmond, the Court
ruled that police roadblocks aimed at discovering drugs violated the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against searches and seizures. 116 The

testimony of Professor Andrew Guthrie Ferguson); Taylor Brook, Recognizing Your Privacy Rights: Facial Recognition Technology and Third Party Doctrine, MICH. TECH. L. REV. (Apr. 25, 2019), http://
mttlr.org/2019/04/recognizing-your-privacy-rights-facial-recognition-technology-and-third-partydoctrine/ [https://perma.cc/2PF9-D5WT].
111. See David Brand, New City Law Compels NYPD to Explain Surveillance Tools and Strategies,
QUEENS EAGLE (July 16, 2020), https://queenseagle.com/all/new-city-law-compels-nypd-to-Seesurveillance-tools-and-strategies [https://perma.cc/4S9N-2QXL].
112. See Garance Burek, Martha Mendoza, Juliet Linderman & Michael Tarm, How AI-Powered
Tech Landed Man in Jail With Scant Evidence, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug.19, 2021), https://apnews.com
/article/artificial-intelligence-algorithm-technology-police-crime-7e3345485aa668c97606d4b54f9b
6220 [https://perma.cc/F97S-WDSF].
113. See id.
114. Goodman, supra note 9, at 797–98.
115. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
116. Id. at 48.
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initial reasons for establishing such roadblocks were simple: the police
chief and mayor implemented the roadblocks in response to the outcry
of residents in Near Westside, Indianapolis, who were tired of widespread drug trafficking and gun violence. 117 The checkpoints, established in what is largely known as a poor neighborhood ridden with
crime, aimed to discover and interdict illegal narcotics and act as a deterrent. 118
Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor stated that law enforcement roadblocks must have a specific purpose beyond the prevention of
crime generally. 119 According to Justice O’Connor, the state must have a
strong interest in that purpose, the roadblock must be an effective way
to achieve that purpose, and the roadblock cannot excessively intrude
on the privacy of innocent individuals stopped in the roadblock. 120 In
reaching that conclusion, the majority explained that the Court has
never approved checkpoint programs that were intended to only detect
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. 121 Instead, the Court has only condoned checkpoint cases involving narrow exceptions to the general rule that a seizure must be accompanied by some measure of individualized suspicion. 122 With that mind, the Court focused its reasoning
on the primary purpose of the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint. This
reasoning included examining the slippery slope that could follow: “We
cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present
possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given
motorists has committed some crime,” and “[i]f we were to rest the case
at this high level of generality, there would be little check on the ability
of the authorities to construct roadblocks for almost any conceivable
law enforcement purpose.” 123
In applying the Edmond rationale to ShotSpotter, we see that the
“primary purpose” of ShotSpotter is to satiate the government’s general

117. See Barry Friedman, Unwarranted: Policing Without Permission 169 (2017).
118. See id. at 170 (noting that Indianapolis Police Department set up daytime roadblocks and
stops over four months. At the checkpoints, an officer would approach cars to advise the driver
that of the drug checkpoint, confirm their license and registration, and look for visible signs of impairment while a narcotics detection dog did a walk around the vehicle).
119. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44.
120. Id. at 47–48.
121. Id. at 41.
122. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (upholding brief [detention or stop of motorists] at Border Patrol checkpoint designed to intercept illegal aliens); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (invalidating a discretionary stop to check a driver’s
license and vehicle registration without any other standard or suspicion).
123. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44.
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interest in reducing neighborhood crime. 124 The logic is as follows: Although an active brief interval stopping of a car is arguably more physically invasive than constant ShotSpotter surveillance, both methods are
used to reduce crime. With roadside checkpoints, officers look for particularized suspicion, whereas ShotSpotter listens for reasonable suspicion via a gunshot sound. ShotSpotter sensors, which are often used
with cameras, actively listen for the sound of gunshots and notify the
police when they hear such gunshots; this purpose does not serve a
“specific purpose” outside the normal purpose of preventing crime generally.
Under this theory, Edmond prohibits law enforcement’s use of
ShotSpotter because there is no individualized suspicion. Hence, similar to the drug interdiction roadblocks that were put in place to curb
drug trafficking and gun violence in Edmond, San Francisco’s placement
of ShotSpotter sensors in three districts where predominantly Black citizens live, Oakland’s employment of twelve ShotSpotter systems across
sixteen miles in Oakland, and New York City spreading its ShotSpotter
technology across seventy square miles, do not serve a specific purpose
besides preventing ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Further, ShotSpotter technology is not tracking a particular suspect or targeting a specific
criminal act or investigation. On the contrary, just like the residents of
the Near Westside of Indianapolis who wanted to end widespread drug
trafficking and gun violence generally, the SFPD, OPD, and NYPD have
placed ShotSpotters in neighborhoods seeking to combat crime and
gun violence writ large.
The research presented by the MacArthur Justice Center and the
Chicago OIG offers compelling reasons why we should be concerned
that ShotSpotter and other surveillance technologies are being used for
general crime prevention. 125 As Andrew Guthrie Ferguson cautions,
“[e]xtensive research . . . has shown that these expansive and powerful
surveillance capabilities have exacerbated rather than reduced bias,

124. Id. at 32, 44–46 (quoting “primary purpose” as the applicable standard). The Court’s reasoning is not without its critics. For example, Professor Christopher Slobogin and other scholars
have observed that the Edmond “general crime control” purpose rationale is practically meaningless
because the Court has never provided a clear definition for lower courts. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Policing As Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 102–03 (2016); Jason Fiebig, Police Checkpoints:
Lack of Guidance From the Supreme Court Contributes to Disregard of Civil Liberties in the District of Columbia, 100 NW. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY, 599, 618–19 (2010); Brooks Holland, The Road Round Edmond: Steering Through Primary Purposes and Crime Control Agendas, 111 PA. ST. L. REV. 293, 300–03 (2006).
125. See supra Part I(A)(ii).

SUMMER 2022]

ShotSpotter Gunshot Detection Technology

789

overreach, and abuse in policing, and they pose a growing threat to civil
liberties.” 126
Any assurances by the ninety police departments that use ShotSpotter who claim that they are not using the technology for the general
purpose of combatting crime should be met with great skepticism. As
seen in the activism over its use in Chicago, ShotSpotter is currently
gaining more media attention as a surveillance tool. 127 However, digital
spying by police is nothing new. There are many reasons to doubt the
sincerity of the police departments when they claim they are not using
policing technologies for dubious ends.
Law enforcement has established a pattern of operating and maintaining what is commonly referred to as a “surveillance state,” which
should inform our approach to viewing their actions today. For example, police departments in major cities use surveillance technology to
watch and track protesters, as evidenced by policing of protest movements surrounding the deaths of George Floyd, Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna Taylor, Rayshard Brooks, and other Black Americans. 128 The Department of Homeland Security monitored and tracked Black Lives
Matter protesters in more than 15 cities using military-grade technology, including infrared and electro-optical cameras and “dirty box” devices on airplanes, drones, and helicopters. 129 On the ground, the SFPD
conducted real-time mass video surveillance of BLM protesters despite
a citywide ban on such conduct. 130 Similarly, in 2015 the Baltimore Police Department used Stingrays and facial recognition technology in
tandem as spying tools. 131 Stingray technology uses military grade cellsite simulators to capture texts, numbers of outgoing calls, emails, seri-

126. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, More Technology Won’t Fix the Problems with Modern Policing,
FASTCOMPANY (June 13, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90516250/more-technology-wontfix-the-problems-with-modern-policing [https://perma.cc/4SUZ-2DWD].
127. See Isiah Holmes, National Campaign Pits Its Sights on Popular Police Gunfire Detection
Tool, Wisconsin Examiner, Apr.29, 2022, https://wisconsinexaminer.com/2022/04/29/nationalcampaign-puts-its-sights-on-popular-police-gunfire-detection-tool/.
128. See Zolan Kanno-Youngs, U.S. Watched George Floyd Protests in 15 Cities Using Aerial Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/19/us/politics/george-floydprotests-surveillance.html [https://perma.cc/KW2F-W6PH].
129. Id.; see Chloe Ketels, Black Lives Matter Protests Under Aerial Surveillance, NATO ASS’N OF
CANADA (July 6, 2020), http://natoassociation.ca/black-lives-matter-protests-under-aerial-surveillance/
[https://perma.cc/2ADE-BWD8].
130. See Dave Maass & Mathew Guariglia, San Francisco Police Accessed Business District Camera
Network to Spy on Protesters, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 27, 2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks
/2020/07/san-francisco-police-accessed-business-district-camera-network-spy-protestors [https://
perma.cc/T9TT-XUUH].
131. See Benjamin Powers, Eyes Over Baltimore: How Police Use Military Tech to Secretly
Track You, RollingStone.com, Jan. 6, 2017, https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features
/eyes-over-baltimore-how-police-use-military-technology-to-secretly-track-you-126885/.
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al numbers, identification, GPS location, actual content of conversation, and other raw and detailed information from unsuspecting
phones and tracks the location of targets and non-targets in apartments, cars, buses, and on streets through mapping software. 132 Stingray technology can even make the tracked device send texts and make
calls. 133
According to media accounts following requests for information
regarding these technologies and their use by police, threats to personal
privacy are real. The Washington Post reported that, in the past three
years alone, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia has
seen a sevenfold surge in law enforcement requests under seal to track
Americans without warrants through cell phone locations and internet
activity in the past three years. 134 Similarly, it was reported that in 2019
the National Security Agency illegally collected communication information from domestic phone calls and text messages. 135 It was also revealed that the FBI searched unsuspecting Americans’ emails without

132. See DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 262 (2017); see also
Austin McCullough, Stingray Searches and the Fourth Amendment Implications of Modern Cellular Surveillance, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. ONLINE 41, 41 (2016).
133. See, e.g., Andrew Hemmer, Duty of Candor in the Digital Age: The Need for Heightened Judicial
Supervision of Stingray Searches, 91 CHI. KENT L. REV. 295, 296 (2016) (describing the tracking abilities
of Stingrays and how they can “hijack” a phone to perform calls and texts disguised as the targeted
phones.
134. Spencer S. Hsu, In District, Warrantless Tracking Requests Surge in Past 3 Years, WASH. POST,
July 19, 2017, at B.5 (revealing law enforcement pen registry and trap and trace requests to conduct
electronic surveillance and track metadata information about telephone, email, and social media,
have increased exponentially in Washington and Northern Virginia, two of the most active federal
courts); see Spencer S. Hsu & Rachel Weiner, U.S. Courts: Electronic Surveillance Up 500 Percent in D.C.
Area Since 2011, Almost All Sealed Cases, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/local/public-safety/us-courts-electronic-surveillance-up-500-percent-in-dc-area-since-2011-almostall-sealed-cases/2016/10/22/48693ffa-8f10-11e6-9c52-0b10449e33c4_story.html [https://perma.cc
/J2T7-EDA8] (explaining that, unlike traditional wiretaps to listen to landline phone calls requiring
probable cause, these requests only require the government to persuade a judge that the information sought is relevant to an investigation); see also Naomi Gillens, New Justice Department Documents Show Huge Increase in Warrantless Electronic Surveillance, ACLU (Sept. 27, 2012, 1:32 PM), https://
www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/new-justice-department-documentsshow-huge-increase [https://perma.cc/HD2W-WVS9].
135. Charlie Savage, N.S.A. Collected Call Data It Was Not Authorized To, N.Y. TIMES (June 27,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/us/telecom-nsa-domestic-calling-records.html [https://
perma.cc/C3DG-G38F] (revealing that the NSA monitors Americans by acquiring data from phone
calls and text messages, and analyzes mapping patterns of movement with other intersecting mobile
device users); see Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations Worldwide,
Snowden Documents Show, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world
/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12
/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_story.html [https://perma.cc/X4CM-ZAAK].
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warrants or individualized grounds for suspicion. 136 Further, despite initial denials, the Los Angeles Police Department admitted to using facial
recognition nearly 30,000 times since 2009.137
Put simply, police misuse and overuse of surveillance technologies
coupled with the various examples regarding failed prosecutions of police when their use of such technologies harm the innocent, such as in
the cases of Silvon Simmons and Michael Williams, certainly mitigate
against trusting law enforcement with using ShotSpotter with little to
no oversight or restriction.
2. Comparing ShotSpotters to Pole Cameras: Towards a
New Analysis of Invasive Police Spying Tools
Again, until the Supreme Court further clarifies the limits of the
Fourth Amendment on gunshot detection technology, lower courts in
the interim can and should apply an Edmond-like analysis, with an eye
towards expanding Fourth Amendment protections. Such an approach
departs from the direction taken by prior courts that have concluded
CCTV and other forms of surveillance does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. 138 Those prior rulings analogized CCTV to ordinary surveillance methods used by a police officer in a public space, or even a
utility worker sitting atop the pole observing the same activities the
camera recorded. 139 Yet, some recent court rulings illustrate how the
government’s video surveillance of a public area could indeed raise
Fourth Amendment concerns. Below, I offer two complimentary decisions that benefit from the teachings of Carpenter v. U.S. 140—one of the
most impactful cases in the past decade. Carpenter brought Katz 141
to the digital era by holding, for the first time, that a person has an ex-

136. Charlie Savage, F.B.I. Practices for Intercepted Emails Violated 4th Amendment, Judge Ruled,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/us/politics/fbi-fisa-court.html
[https://perma.cc/G94V-HYZC].
137. See Report: LAPD Used Facial Recognition Nearly 30,000 Times, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept.21,
2020), https://apnews.com/article/technology-los-angeles-police-archive-crime-b45a07e5430aa
4565930d5e606788714 [https://perma.cc/W4BT-SSKT].
138. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (observations surveilled from plane flying over house); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (observations surveilled from helicopter flying
above greenhouse in residential backyard); Henderson v. People, 879 P.2d 383, 390 (Colo. 1994) (observations surveilled from helicopter flying over residence).
139. See People v. Tafoya (Tafoya I), 490 P.3d 532 (Colo. App. 2019) (citing prior rulings but ruling surveillance activity was not a search under the Fourth Amendment).
140. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
141. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See supra note 104 for an explanation of the Katz
test.
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pectation
of
privacy
in the whole of his or her physical movement and that law enforcement
agencies generally need a warrant to track suspects’ locations using cellsite location information (CSLI). 142
First, in People v. Tafoya 143 the Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that
police violated the Fourth Amendment when they used a utility polemounted video camera to spy into Tafoya’s backyard continuously for
three months, reversing Tafoya’s conviction. The Court of Appeals rejected the States argument that video surveillance was not a search because Tafoya’s property could also have been seen through a gap in the
fence by any person on the sidewalk or by a neighbor in the stairway of a
nearby apartment. 144 The court reasoned that video surveillance was
much more efficient than human surveillance because: (1) it was unlikely that any pedestrian or neighbor would peer through a gap in a sixfoot privacy fence or stand on his or her outdoor stairway for three
months; and (2) it is equally improbable that someone would watch in a
helicopter or watch through a camera installed on a drone. 145 The court
stressed that the duration of the monitoring was especially relevant to
the issue of whether the police department engaged in a “search.” 146 The
court acknowledged that, just because a citizen’s actions were otherwise observable by the public at large, this alone does not foreclose a
finding of a “search.” 147 Recently, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld
the Court of Appeals’ decision. 148 Chief Justice Brian Boatwright, writing on behalf of the court, focused on the duration, continuity, and surreptitious nature of the surveillance of Tafoya’s property and opined
that the constant surveillance involved an unanticipated degree of intrusion equal to tracking and mapping a person’s location. 149
Second, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Mora concluded that continuous long-term police surveillance through five
hidden police video cameras with real time zoom capabilities on public

142. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217, 2221. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, ruled that cell phone users possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in the CSLI history associated with their cell phones. Accessing a person’s historical cell-site
records—or at least seven days or more of cell site records—is a Fourth Amendment search because it violates the person’s “legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements.” Id. at 2217.
143. Tafoya I, 490 P.3d 532.
144. Id. at 538–41.
145. Id. at 541–42.
146. Id. at 540.
147. Id. at 541.
148. People v. Tafoya (Tafoya II), 494 P.3d 613 (Colo. 2021)
149. Id. at 622–23.
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telephone and electrical poles violated the Fourth Amendment. 150 The
court rejected the Commonwealth’s contention that the absence of
fencing or other efforts to shield the residences from view demonstrates that the defendants did not have a subjective expectation of privacy in those areas. 151 On the contrary, the court concluded that the defendants did not expect to be surveilled coming and going from their
homes over an extended period of time. 152 The court noted that targeted, long-term camera surveillance of the area surrounding a residence
has the capacity to invade the security of the home, and it is even more
revealing than cell-site location information or GPS tracking. 153 Reminiscent of the reasoning in Tafoya II, the court was not swayed by the
Commonwealth’s argument that the video surveillance was merely a
substitute for human surveillance. 154 The court reasoned that, as a depository for data, camera surveillance offers a far richer profile of a person’s life than human surveillance. 155
Similar analytical beats are heard when considering gun detection
technology. Given that ShotSpotter’s sole function is to vigilantly listen
for gunshots 24/7, ShotSpotter is intended to be more accurate and dependable than the human ears of police officers. Even though a gunshot
sound detected by ShotSpotter could also be heard by an officer walking
down or standing stationary on a street, it is improbable that a human
police officer would listen attentively at all times of the day for a gunshot. A human cannot sustain the same level of heightened attention,
without ever growing distracted or tiring out. In contrast, a ShotSpotter sensor will not be distracted by conversations with others, need restroom break, or need to prepare for a shift change. Obviously, gun detection technology differs from CCTV, but will future courts reason that
the use of ShotSpotters requires individualized suspicion? Because we
live in a world where surveillance technology is rapidly evolving, it could
take many years for a ShotSpotter case to make its way to the (now conservative majority) Supreme Court for a ruling on its constitutionality.
Meanwhile, at the very least, as with facial recognition technology and
Stingrays, comprehensive legislation is needed to regulate the use of
gun detection technology. 156
150. Commonwealth v. Mora, 150 N.E.3d 297 (Mass. 2020).
151. Id. at 366–67.
152. Id. at 368–69.
153. Id. at 370.
154. Id. at 374.
155. Id.
156. Bill S.847, the Commercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act of 2019, was introduced in the
Senate to prohibit the commercial use of facial recognition technology to identify and track consumers without consent. This bill placed limitations on the third-party sharing of collected face
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Mindful of the need for immediate pragmatic reforms, Professor
Christopher Slobogin proposes that administrative law apply to pervasive surveillance programs such as New York’s Domain Awareness System (DAS) which was originally developed by the NYPD and Microsoft
as a counterterrorism platform and is now used for criminal investigations including detecting loiterers. 157 DAS centralizes information from
NYPD’s 20,000 CCTVs through the five Burroughs and CCTV videos
provided from private entities, along with captured images from 500 license plate readers, transit data points, ShotSpotter data, radiation
scanners, drones, 911 calls and commercial and interagency databases. 158 Slobogin argues that such surveillance systems, given their inherent administrative nature, should be regulated by statutes and regulations—not warrants. 159 As such, police agencies should be treated like
other agencies. 160 According to Slobogin, when applied to new policing
surveillance technologies such as DAS administrative law principles—
such as the notice and comment requirement—will create transparency. 161 further, this process would afford opportunities for the public to
print data and required entities to meet certain minimum data security standards. Jeffrey D.
Neuburger, Bipartisan Facial Recognition Privacy Bill Introduced in Congress, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 26,
2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/bipartisan-facial-recognition-privacy-bill-introducedcongress [https://perma.cc/BPG9-WATL]. On the west coast, California’s Electronic Communications Privacy Act went into effect in 2016, and requires government entities in California to obtain a warrant based on probable cause before they can obtain a person’s electronic communication
information from a person’s service provider or electronic device. California Electronic Communications Privacy Act, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546 (West 2017). The California Consumer Privacy Act
(CCPA) is the most expansive state privacy law in the United States. See Joseph J. Lazzarotti,
Jason C. Gavejian & Maya Atrakchi, State Law Developments in Consumer Privacy, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 15,
2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/state-law-developments-consumer-privacy [https://
perma.cc/CUA8-JC3G]. There has been mounting outcry on the grass-roots level against Stingray
surveillance, demanding that police be more transparent about the surveillance, and that the public be allowed to participate in the decision-making process over how Stingrays are used. States
have passed laws that protect citizens’ cell phone data and which require police to get a warrant to
use a Stingray. See, e.g., Katherine M. Sullivan, Comment, Is Your Smartphone Conversation Private?
The StingRay Device’s Impact on Privacy in States, 67 CATH. U.L. REV. 388, 400–01 (2018).
157. CITY OF N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, DOMAIN AWARENESS SYSTEM: IMPACT AND USE POLICY 3–4 (Apr.
11, 2021), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/post-final/domainawareness,-system-das-nypd-impact-and-use-policy_4.9.21_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PJT-2D
2D]; ANGEL DIAZ, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT SURVEILLANCE
TECHNOLOGY, (2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/new-york-citypolice-department-surveillance-technology [https://perma.cc/8AWJ-C8U7]. Slobogin, supra note 125,
at 91.
158. CITY OF N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 156; DIAZ, supra note 156; Albert Fox Cahn & Will
Luckman, Microsoft Needs to Stop Selling Surveillance to the NYPD, FASTCOMPANY (July 2, 2020),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90523877/microsoft-needs-to-stop-selling-surveillance-to-the-nypd
[https://perma.cc/2NMX-TWD2].
159. Slobogin, supra note 124, at 91.
160. Id. at 151–52.
161. Id. at 139, 151.
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learn about the abilities and scope of the proposed surveillance program, and offer input about the implementation of the program.162
Though it is unclear whether legislatures and courts would seriously
consider adopting Slobogin’s approach, his work nevertheless highlights the shortcomings of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as it applies to surveillance technologies.
II. TESTING TERRY’S LIMITS WITH GUNSHOTS IN 2020 AND BEYOND: AN
EMERGING CIRCUIT SPLIT
Building on the conclusions made by the MacArthur Justice Center
and OIG reports, this Section analyzes how law enforcement routinely
exploit stop-and-frisks to create what is essentially an occupied police
state. This Section begins with a summary of the Terry doctrine and its
reasonable belief requirement and proceeds to examine an emerging
jurisdictional split between the Fourth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits on
the Fourth Amendment exigent circumstances exception. This Section
discusses how these analyses can work to inform our understanding of
the efficacy of ShotSpotter use by law enforcement today and in the future.
A. Terry v. Ohio
Race and the Fourth Amendment have always been intertwined. 163
The origins of the modern police practice of targeting Black Americans
can be traced to Terry v. Ohio, 164 where the Court ruled that searches undertaken by police officers are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, so long as the officer “reasonably” believes that the suspect has
weapon which poses a threat to the officer’s safety while investigating
suspicious behavior. 165 Terry involved suspects casing a store. 166 Although the officer lacked a warrant, he had reasonable and articulable
suspicion for the stop, which occurred during a crime in progress.167
The officer found a gun on petitioner during a frisk. 168 Under Terry, of162. Id. at 140, 149, 152.
163. See Carol Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 839 (1994).
164. 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
165. Id. at 30–31.
166. Id. at 6.
167. See id. at 28.
168. Id. at 7; see Stephen A. Saltzburg & Daniel J. Capra, American Criminal Procedure: Cases
and Commentary 42–43 (9th ed. 2007).
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ficers must point to some objective facts or observations that are sufficient to show reasonable suspicion under the circumstances, and courts
must assess the reasonableness of searches and seizures from an objective point of view. 169 Officers have broad and completely unfettered discretion to conduct searches and seizures, since the requirement to
demonstrate reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing has been diluted so much since Terry. 170 Essentially, the police can justify their decision to stop and frisk regardless of true motivation, and courts tend to
give police the benefit of the doubt when reviewing their conduct. 171 As a
result, Terry’s “reasonable articulable suspicion” standard has been used
as a weapon against minority communities in various instances, including during the “War on Drugs,” traffic stops, and as discussed below,
efforts to reduce gun violence. 172
When Terry is considered in the context of police using ShotSpotter
alerts, does the sound of gunshots—without more—raise any individualized suspicion that a particular individual stopped was engaged in
criminal activity?173 This question was explored in a jurisdictional split
that emerged in the Fourth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits in 2020. In
United States v. Rickmon, a divided Seventh Circuit ruled that the sound
of gunfire created an “emergency” that justified police stopping a vehicle. 174 Contrastingly, in United States v. Delaney, the D.C. Circuit held
that gunshots are not a license to stop anyone nearby without reasonable articulable suspicion. 175 In United States v. Curry, the Fourth Circuit
held that gunshots do not create “exigent circumstances.” 176 These rulings are dissected below.

169. Professor Stephen Saltzburg explains, “the [Terry] Court not only permitted stops and
frisks on less than probable cause, it also explicitly invoked the reasonableness clause over the warrant clause as the governing standard.” SALTZBURG, supra note 168, at 201.
170. After Terry it became increasingly unclear when stops are permissible. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 117, at 154.
171. GRAY, supra note 132, at 279.
172. See Jack B. Weinstein & Mae C. Quinn, Terry, Race and Judicial Integrity: The Court and Suppression During the War on Drugs, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1323, 1323, 1329 (1998); see also Harvey Gee, Surveillance State: Fourth Amendment Law, Big Data Policing, and Facial Recognition Technology 21 BERKELEY
J. AFR. AM. L. & POL’Y 43, 67–68 (2021) (reviewing FERGUSON, supra note 97, and SIMMONS, supra note
95).
173. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
174. United States v. Rickmon, 952 F.3d 876, 879, 884 (7th Cir. 2020).
175. United States v. Delaney, 955 F.3d 1077, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
176. United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 331 (4th Cir. 2020).
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B. Seventh Circuit: Totality of the Circumstances Provided Reasonable
Suspicion for Police to Stop the Car
The Seventh Circuit in Rickmon considered whether law enforcement may constitutionally stop a vehicle based on a ShotSpotter alert
and 911 calls. 177 The Peoria Police Department’s ShotSpotter system sent
a mobile data terminal alert in the early morning about two gunshots
coming from North Ellis Street. 178 Responding officers were notified
that three more gunshots had been detected in the area, cars were leaving the area, and a 911 caller reported witnessing a “black male on foot”
running northbound. 179 Officer Ellefritz, who arrived first on the scene,
saw a car coming in the opposite direction. 180 After the car was stopped,
the two occupants inside pointed towards the end of a dead-end street
where a crowd was gathered and yelling: “They are down there!” 181 Ellefritz held the occupants at gunpoint until backup arrived. Rickmon, the
passenger, explained that he had been shot, and the driver gave consent
to search the car which turned up a handgun under the passenger seat
where Rickmon was sitting. 182
Rickmon’s unsuccessful motion to suppress claimed that the ShotSpotter system was inaccurate and unreliable, and that a ShotSpotter
report alone should not allow police officers to stop the car just because
it happened to be in the area, absent any individualized suspicion. 183
Rickmon argued that Ellefritz stopped the car based on an “unparticular
hunch” and there were no “specific and articulable facts” linking the car
to the shooting. 184 The district court disagreed and held that the totality
of the circumstances provided Ellefritz with reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity to justify the stop. 185
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit sidestepped the issue of whether the
ShotSpotter system was reliable, explaining in a footnote that it was
unnecessary to address the question because the 911 calls corroborated
the ShotSpotter reports and Rickmon was in the system’s coverage
zone:

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Rickmon, 952 F.3d at 878.
Id. at 879.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 881.
Id.
Id.
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Rickmon has somewhat taken issue with ShotSpotter’s reliability . . . The district court also received evidence that ShotSpotter is not always accurate and that officers may not solely rely
on it to locate gunfire. As Rickmon points out, the record here
does not demonstrate how often the Peoria Police Department
received incorrect ShotSpotter reports or anything else attesting to the reliability of the system . . . We therefore take his argument as based on reasonable suspicion and need not reach
the reliability of ShotSpotter. In some future decision, we may
have to determine ShotSpotter’s reliability where a single alert
turns out to be the only articulable fact in the totality of the circumstances. 186
The majority opinion raised sua sponte the argument that a ShotSpotter alert generates a report of an “emergency,” not just a sound. 187
To the court, an alert is the equivalent of an anonymous tip, and therefore a ShotSpotter report, analyzed within the totality of the circumstances, can support an officer’s reasonable suspicion. 188 This cleared
the way for the panel majority to affirm the district court’s decision. In
the eyes of the panel, the totality of the circumstances provided reasonable suspicion for Ellefritz, based on his experience, to initiate the traffic stop. 189 These circumstances included: (1) two ShotSpotter alerts and
a caller reporting sounds of gunfire, (2) the car was the only one driving
away from a dead end street, and (3) Ellefritz had past experience with
shots-fired calls in the same area. 190
Yet, a close reading of Rickmon supports an alternative conclusion:
Officer Ellefritz failed to identify specific articulable facts supporting
the stop and acted on only a hunch about the car. Under this alternate
theory, the majority panel erred by applying a lax exigent circumstances
standard that did not honor Terry by broadly declaring that the sound of
gunshots always translates into an emergency. Gunshot sounds do not
186. Id. at 879 n.2. This was not the first time that the Seventh Circuit chose not to analyze policing technology. The Circuit previously sided with the government's use of Stingrays in United
States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540 (2016), which was the first time that a federal court substantively discussed the warrantless use of a Stingray. In affirming Patrick’s conviction, the panel majority
punted on the substantive questions about whether a warrant was required to use the Stingray,
and whether a cell site simulator is a reasonable means of executing a warrant. Id. at 545. The panel
narrowly ruled that Patrick did not have any privacy interest in a public place, and reasoned that
regardless of the Stingray, Patrick was taken into custody based on probable cause and an arrest
warrant. Id.
187. Rickmon, 952 F.3d at 883.
188. Id. at 882.
189. Id. at 884.
190. Id. at 882–84.
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create an emergency because ShotSpotter systems merely report
sounds, and gunshot detection technology does not discern what is or is
not a real emergency. As such, ShotSpotter does not provide the necessary individualized suspicion as to who in particular may have committed a crime. 191 Chief Judge Dianne Wood made similar points in her dissent, challenging both the majority’s assumption that the car must have
been connected to the shots because it was the only car found on North
Ellis five minutes after the ShotSpotter alert as “‘pure speculation’” and
the majority’s justification for the stop under the less-demanding exigent circumstances standard: 192
My colleagues also stress that Ellefritz believed that he was responding to an emergency, because gunshots always connote
emergency. Perhaps they do. But how much does this prove?
Would it have entitled the police to force their way into every
house on North Ellis, to make sure that the shooter was not
threatening anyone in those houses? Would it have allowed the
police to stop any and every car they saw within 1,000 feet of the
point that ShotSpotter identified? My answer to both those
questions is no. And I cannot agree with my colleagues that a
single car proceeding north, at the speed limit signals an emergency. 193
In the shadow of Judge Wood’s cautionary tale, Petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari arguing that, under the Rickmon majority’s rea191. See Goodman, supra note 9, at 825–26 (2021) (suggesting that the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Rickmon is flawed and arguing that “there are no facts to suggest that Officer Ellefritz had individualized or particularized suspicion that the occupants of Rickmon’s vehicle were involved in
the shooting, or otherwise armed and dangerous.”).
192. Id. In a recent case, People v. Mendoza, the California Court of Appeals expressed a contrasting viewpoint, when it ruled that Border Patrol agents must have objectively reasonable suspicion to stop vehicles in known drug areas, and a “good faith” hunch is insufficient grounds to do
so. 258 Cal. Rptr. 3d 249, 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020). The court determined that it was not objectively
reasonable to suspect the defendant to be involved in criminal activity based on her driving in a
known drug trafficking corridor that crossed the U.S. Mexico border. Id. at 255. The court observed that “295,000” vehicles traveled on the heavily traveled Interstate 15 in 2008 and “1,858,239”
personal vehicles entered the United States from Mexico through the San Ysidro port of entry in
November 2017. Id. The court acknowledged that there existed reasons to look into the appellant’s
crossing onto Interstate 15, but:
[T]hey provided almost no basis for thinking she was involved in criminal activity.
Those factors alone would draw into suspicion tens of thousands of people every day,
perhaps more. The factors law enforcement rely on to justify a stop, if amenable to innocent explanation, õmust serve to eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers.’ Id. at 255–56 (internal citations omitted).
193.

Rickmon, 952 F.3d at 886 (J. Wood, dissenting).
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soning, police can indiscriminately stop persons standing, walking, sitting, sleeping, or driving within earshot of what they perceive to be
gunfire. 194 As Petitioner pointed out, this is far-reaching because the
majority effectively created a new exception to Terry that permits anything that even remotely sounds like a gunshot to be treated as an
“emergency.” 195 As such, if ShotSpotter hears fireworks, a car backfire,
or construction work, an “emergency” would enable police to mix and
match the alert with some other “suspicious circumstance” in a “high
crime area” to create a totality of circumstances that warrants unrestrained police discretion. As the remaining part of this Section illustrates, Petitioner’s opinion raises substantial and alarming concerns.
C. D.C. Circuit: Police Lacked Reasonable Suspicion to Justify Stops
After New Year’s Eve Celebratory Gunfire
In United States v. Delaney, two Metro Police Department officers
were patrolling a residential area in Washington, D.C. for celebratory
gunfire on New Year’s Eve 2017 when the officers heard “‘repeated gunfire in multiple directions’” nearby. 196 One minute later, the officers observed Delaney and another person sitting in a parked Jeep, kissing. 197
The officers blocked Delaney’s jeep with their police cruiser. 198 One officer questioned the passenger, as the other officer surveyed the parking lot. During questioning, a scuffle between the officers and Delaney
ensued. 199 A search of the Jeep uncovered a handgun under the passenger seat along with spent casings in and around the vehicle. 200
The trial court denied Delaney’s motion to suppress, finding that
the government established reasonable suspicion because Delaney was
found in an almost empty parking lot a block from the sound of the
gunshots and engaged in “‘strange’ and ‘suspicious’” kissing. 201 The
D.C. Circuit, however, reversed the holding. Judge David Tatel applied
traditional doctrinal analysis to determine that (1) the officers violated

194. See id. at 883 (majority opinion) (acknowledging that gun violence is inherently dangerous, and together with an anonymous 911 call making an emergency report, may be sufficient to
support an officer’s reasonable suspicion); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 13, Rickmon v.
United States, 952 F.3d 876 (2020) (No. 20-733), cert denied, 141 S. Ct. 2505 (2021).
195. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 194, at 4.
196. United States v. Delaney, 955 F.3d 1077, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
197. Id. at 1079–80.
198. Id. at 1080.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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the Fourth Amendment when they seized Delaney because they lacked
reasonable suspicion to justify the stop, and (2) the government failed to
identify specific and articulable facts supporting the officers’ reasons
for the stop. 202 The panel found no evasive conduct on Delaney’s behalf,
and concluded that the officers pulled into the parking lot and stopped
Delaney based on a hunch about the origins of the shots. 203
Subsequently, in United States v. Carter, 204 District Judge John Bates
relied heavily on Delaney in granting petitioner’s motion to suppress. In
Carter, MPD officers were patrolling the Sixth District, a “high crime
area” in D.C., on New Year’s Eve 2019 when they received a ShotSpotter
alert about possible gunshots. 205 The officers saw three individuals
walking westbound on Nash Street Northeast, away from the sound of
the gunshots. 206 The police cruiser followed the men and pulled up next
to them as they were walking. 207 Then, Officer Dabney got out of the car
and told the men, “stop and talk to me real quick, come over to me real
quick and then I’ll get out of your way[.]” 208 The three men, who were
standing between a police car and a fence, complied with the request. 209
Dabney found it suspicious that Carter kept his right upper arm pinned
to his body, which indicated to him that Carter was carrying a weapon.
Carter was apprehended after he tried to run off, and a handgun was
recovered from Carter’s jacket pocket.210
Judge Bates rejected the government’s argument that the ShotSpotter system identified gunshots in a relatively small, high-crime area just
a minute before the encounter, thereby establishing reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot under Terry. 211 To Bates, it did not
matter that Carter and his companions were the only people the officers
saw in that area. On this basis, the court concluded that the government failed to produce sufficiently specific information demonstrating
the officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Carter was
engaged in criminal activity. 212 Accordingly, the court granted Carter’s
suppression motion. 213
202.
203.
204.
2020).
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 1087.
Id. at 1086–87.
See United States v. Carter, Crim No. 20-05 (JDB), 2020 WL 3893023, at *4 (D.D.C. Jul. 10,
Id., at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id., at *2.
Id., at *6.
Id., at *8.
Id.

802

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 55:4

D. Fourth Circuit: A Gunshot Sound Is Not An Emergency Exigent
Circumstance Near Government Subsidized Housing Developments
In United States v. Curry, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether the Fourth Amendment’s exigent circumstances doctrine justified the suspicionless seizure of Curry. 214 Richmond Police Officers arrived at Walcott Place, a government subsidized housing development,
in response to several gunshots that were fired nearby less than a minute before. 215 Curry and five to eight other men were calmly walking
away from the general area where the officers believed the shots originated. 216 With no suspect description, and with only corroborating reports of shots fired in the area, the officers fanned out and began approaching the men. 217 After Curry was stopped, an officer performed a
pat down because he was not able to visually check for a bulge, and a
struggle ensued that led to the discovery of a gun on Curry’s person.218
The district court’s ruling that exigent circumstances did not justify
the suspicionless investigatory stop was reversed by an appellate panel. 219 An en banc Fourth Circuit disagreed, however, holding that the
stop was not justified by exigent circumstances. 220 As an initial matter,
the en banc majority opinion noted that the government did not claim
that Curry’s stop was a valid Terry stop, and was proceeding only on the
single claim that Curry’s seizure was justified by exigent circumstances. 221 In the first section of the opinion, after acknowledging the lack of
Supreme Court guidance on the applicability of the exigent circumstances doctrine to the investigatory stop of a person, the majority proceeded to analyze the few Supreme Court cases that purported to extend the exigent circumstances exception to suspicionless,
investigatory seizures of a person. 222
To the dismay of the government, a brief review of these cases only
supported the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that gunshot sounds do not
create an emergency or threat of imminent harm, such that the “individualized suspicion” required by Terry attaches to anyone near the
sound of a gunshot. 223 To begin, in Mincey v. Arizona, 224 the Court ex-

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 315 (4th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 316.
See id. at 316–17.
Id. at 317.
Id.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 320.
Id.
Id. at 323–25.
See id. at 326.

SUMMER 2022]

ShotSpotter Gunshot Detection Technology

803

plained that the exception applies where “‘the exigencies of the situation’
make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless
search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” 225 The
Court found that no exigent circumstances existed in such instances
where police execute an exhaustive and intrusive warrantless search
over four days after the shooting of a police officer. 226 Decades later, the
Court in Brigham City v. Stuart 227 defined exigent circumstances to include the need “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” 228 In
that case, officers arrived at a house in the early morning and saw
through a window a scuffle between a juvenile and several adults. 229 An
officer opened the screen door and then announced his presence to stop
the altercation. 230 The Court reasoned that the officer’s subjective motives to either make an arrest and gather evidence or to prevent further
violence did not matter, since the officers had an objectively reasonable
basis for taking action. 231
Following up, in Kentucky v. King, 232 the Court analyzed the “policecreated exigency” doctrine and held that officers may “conduct an otherwise permissible search without first obtaining a warrant.” 233 The case
concerned police officers who followed a suspected drug dealer to an
apartment complex. 234 Without seeing which apartment the suspect ran
into, the officer smelled marijuana outside the wrong apartment door,
knocked loudly, and announced the officers’ presence. 235 Officers forced
their way into the apartment after hearing noises consistent with the
“destruction of evidence” coming from the apartment. 236 Justice Alito,
writing for the majority, held that the exigency justified the warrantless
search of the apartment because the conduct of the police preceding the
exigency was reasonable. 237
224. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
225. See id. at 393–94 (citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)).
226. Id. at 387–89, 393–94.
227. 547 U.S. 398 (2006).
228. Id. at 403 (citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 (1963) (plurality opinion)).
229. Id. at 400–01.
230. Id. at 401.
231. Id. at 404–05. Fourth Amendment scholar Kit Kinports argues that the Court has not relaxed the probable cause requirement in exigent circumstances cases involving less invasive intrusions. Kit Kinports, The Quantum of Suspicion Needed for an Exigent Circumstances Search, 52 U. MICH.
J. L. REFORM 615, 628–29 (2019).
232. 563 U.S. 452 (2011).
233. Id. at 455, 461.
234. Id. at 455–57.
235. See id. at 456.
236. Id. at 455–56.
237. Id. at 462, 469–72. Justice Ginsburg as the sole dissenter, argued that no urgency existed
and a warrant was needed because the requirement of “exigent circumstances” was not met, and a
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Considering this background, the Curry majority applied the
Court’s reasoning from the “exigent circumstances” cases and determined that no exigent circumstances existed. 238 While the officers
heard shots and received corroboration that the shots came from the
apartment complex, the police lacked any description of the suspect or
indicia that the suspect was nearby. 239 The court deemed knowledge
about prior shootings in the Creighton Court area to be insufficient justification for a suspicionless seizure. 240 In the third part of the opinion,
the court applied a Terry analysis to conclude that the police had no reasonable basis to suspect that Curry fired the gunshots. 241 From the
Court’s perspective, if the officers were allowed to circumvent Terry’s
individualized suspicion requirement, it “would completely cripple a
fundamental Fourth Amendment protection and create a dangerous
precedent.” 242 In closing, with the Black Lives Matter summer protests
fresh in the minds of the judges, the Court acknowledged the realities
of policing in communities of color:
In our present society, the demographics of those who reside in
high crime neighborhoods often consist of racial minorities and
individuals disadvantaged by their social and economic circumstances. To conclude that mere presence in a high crime area at
night is sufficient justification for detention by law enforcement is to accept carte blanche the implicit assertion that Fourth
Amendment protections are reserved only for a certain race or
class of people. We denounce such an assertion. 243
Circuit judges in disagreement present additional insights into the
boundaries of the Fourth Amendment. For example, in his Curry concurrence, Chief Judge Gregory preemptively responded to dissent by
suggesting that the majority ruling was not a setback to predictive policing. 244 To the contrary, he suggested, the majority opinion did not
hinder the police from continuing to use smart policies to identify
crime patterns and dispatch officers to perceived high-crime neighbor-

warrant was necessary. Id. at 473 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She suggested the majority opinion
gives police license to routinely violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 474–75.
238. United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 321–31 (4th Cir. 2020).
239. Id. at 317.
240. Id. at 331.
241. See id. at 329–31.
242. Id. at 326.
243. See id. at 331 (quoting U.S. v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 542 (4th Cir. 2013)).
244. Id. at 334 (Gregory, C.J., concurring).
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hoods. 245 In contrast, Judge Wynn’s concurrence reflects the skepticism
shared by many of us regarding predictive policing systems in “high
crime areas.”246 If the high crime area consideration is removed, he
opined, then the police could make suspicionless stops of anyone after
the sound of gunshot. 247
Similarly, the debate over the efficacy of big data policing was debated in Curry between Judge Thacker, Judge Wilkinson, and Judge
Richardson. Judge Thacker wrote a separate concurrence, joined by
Judge Keenan, where he strongly criticized Judge Wilkinson’s dissent
for hailing predictive policing as an “innovation” in policing. Thacker
argues predictive policing is not a panacea:
Although of relatively recent vintage, the “innovation” of preventive policing, which uses computer algorithms to predict
high crime areas, is no longer the shiny new object it may once
have appeared to be, but instead has revealed itself to be tarnished with racial bias. Predictive policing is merely a covert effort to attempt to justify racial profiling. 248
Of particular concern to Thacker are the racial implications of “hot spot
policing,” which uses historic crime data to predict future crime hot
spots. 249
In contrast, dissenting Judge Wilkinson commended the Richmond
Police Department’s use of “predictive policing” strategies such as “hot
spot policing,” and posited that, “[t]he majority has delivered a gutpunch to predictive policing.” 250 According to Wilkinson, requiring responding police officers to “wait for identifying information” before
taking action makes communities less safe. 251 In his dissent, Judge
Richardson, joined by Judges Wilkinson, Niemeyer, Agee, Quattlebaum, and Rushing, wrote: “I fear the majority’s sweeping decision—
outlawing a modest response to a serious threat—guts the exigentcircumstances doctrine and handcuffs law enforcement’s response to
possible active-shooter situations.” 252
In concurrence, Judge Diaz, joined by Judge Harris, took an altogether different analytical approach, and cited to the rationale and re245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 334.
Id. at 334–36 (Wynn, J., concurring).
Id. at 337.
Id. at 344 (Thacker, J., concurring).
Id. at 344–45.
Id. at 347, 350 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 348.
Id. at 351 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
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sult of Edmond which he argued controlled the disposition of the case.
He asserted that the “exigent circumstances” proffered by the government did not “authorize the measures the officers took to investigate
the origin of the gunfire.” 253 Diaz disagreed with the government’s insistence that the exigencies faced by the officers justified their suspicionless stop of Curry and removed the need to establish “individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.” 254
As Petitioner emphasized in his cert petition, the D.C. and Fourth
Circuit’s court rulings offer rationales that are more consistent with existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence than the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Rickmon. 255 Although these cases can be factually distinguished from one another, they share similar facts sufficient to assume
consistent results. With this in mind, the approach taken in Delaney,
Carter, and Curry, where “the courts rejected any notion of a watereddown version of Terry—in which the sound of gunshots casts a wide net
of suspicion over all who may stand, walk, or drive nearby 256—is more
reliable in terms of expected outcomes. Within this analytical framework, the sound of gunshots, without more, would not raise any individualized suspicion that a particular individual stopped was engaged
in criminal activity under Terry. Delaney and Curry can serve as reminders to courts and law enforcement to take seriously the text and history
of the Fourth Amendment, which was designed to be a counterweight
to the authority of government agents armed with general warrants and
writs of assistance to conduct broad and indiscriminate searches with
impunity. 257
III. RACIALIZED POLICING, AND REFORMING STOP AND FRISK TOWARDS
LASTING COMMUNITY-BASED SOLUTIONS
“We must face our racial history and our racial present.” 258
Without doubt, outrage over police brutality and violence reached a
crescendo when millions organized together in solidarity protesting for
racial justice in 2020. 259 Mindful of that, this Section applies Critical

253. Id. at 339–40 (Diaz, J., concurring).
254. See id. at 339–40 (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000)).
255. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 194, at 14.
256. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 194, at 9 (internal citation omitted).
257. GRAY, supra note 132, at 70–71.
258. Michelle Alexander, America, This is Your Chance, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2020), https://www.ny
times.com/2020/06/08/opinion/george-floyd-protests-race.html [https://perma.cc/3SL5-PTKE].
259. See Kanno-Youngs, supra note 128.
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Race Theory (CRT) to examine the broken relationship between the
Fourth Amendment and over-policing in communities of color. Critical
Race Theory is a useful tool to understand Fourth Amendment search
and seizure law and, moreover, the relationship between law and racial
justice. 260 “Critical race theorists assert that the law ‘constructs race’ by
separating people into groups, assigning social meaning to these
groups, and instituting hierarchical arrangements. Racial inequalities
persist because race informs all areas of the law[.]” 261 Building on this
premise, in the past 30 years, CRT has evolved and is more commonly
applied to the interrelated areas of criminal law, criminal procedure,
and mass incarceration. 262 As a result, CRT now offers a broader understanding of Fourth Amendment search and seizure law, one that moves
beyond the traditional doctrinal analysis applied by courts.
A sampling of this work brings new insights. First, Professor Paul
Butler, in his volume Chokehold: Policing Black Men, offers a raw and unapologetic indictment of the purposefully broken American criminal
justice system that targets Black men and pushes them into incarceration through lawful means. 263 Broadly speaking, Butler explains that
Black men are incarcerated largely because of their race—not because
of poverty or poor choices. 264 Butler’s inquiry is seen through the lens of
“policing Black men” as “thugs” within a larger cultural context of white
supremacy, entertainment, sports, and a legacy of slavery and Jim Crow
imposed through police brutality, racial profiling, and stop-and-frisk
searches. 265 Butler next argues that stop-and-frisk does not make communities safer, and explains how easily police can meet the “reasonable
suspicion” standard set by Terry. Stop-and-frisk is the leading crime
policy that allows police to stop Black and Latino men for trivial offenses like jaywalking or spitting on the sidewalk. 266 Butler says the stopand-frisk, as the country’s primary crime control mechanism, is a “central source of inequality, discrimination, and police abuse.” 267

260.
261.
262.

See PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 76–77 (2017).
Id. at 184.
See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, UNREASONABLE: BLACK LIVES, POLICE POWER, AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT (2022); I. Bennett Capers, Afrofuturism, Critical Race Theory and Policing in the Year 2044,
94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2019); I. Bennett Capers, Critical Race Theory and Criminal Justice, 12 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 1 (2014); Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed To: The Limits of Criminal
Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L. J. 1419 (2016).
263. See PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 9–10 (2017).
264. Id. at 17–18.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 83.
267. Id. at 83.
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Second, the placement of expensive ShotSpotter sensors on rooftops to listen gunshot sounds in “high crime” areas on its own will not
reduce violence. Rather, it is more likely to perpetuate what Professor
Michelle Alexander has coined as “mass incarceration” in her influential
book, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness.
“Mass incarceration” has since made its way into the vernacular in conversations about criminal justice reform. 268 Due to ShotSpotter, more
Black men are stopped just because they happen to be in ShotSpotter
coverage areas where an “emergency” was signaled by the sound of a
gunshot. 269 These men will remain trapped in a racial and broken criminal revolving door. Alexander argues that the increased scrutiny of racial biases in stop and searches, plea bargaining, and sentencing is welcome. 270 Attention should be paid to the caste system that depends on
the prison label affixed to felons, not the time they served in prison. The
felon label precludes a felon from employment and access to housing, as
well as enjoying the privileges of citizens, such as voting and jury service. 271 Felons will continue to be cycled in and out of prison, monitored
by the police, and precluded from participating in mainstream society.
Living in this reality, some cities have crafted alternative action
plans to combat gun violence that have proven effective. In Bleeding Out:
The Devastating Consequences of Urban Violence—And a Bold New Plan for
Peace in the Streets, Thomas Abt, Director of the National Commission on
COVID-19 and Criminal Justice, examines various approaches to reducing urban violence, which he insists should be considered an urgent national emergency. 272 Abt implores communities and law enforcement to
work together to reduce gun violence in a new paradigm for addressing
urban violence in America, advocating for anti-crime and anti-violence
deterrence strategies targeting high-risk offenders and mayhem-prone
groups and for deploying additional police patrols to high-crime neighborhood “hot spots” to quell criminal activity and get guns off the

268. See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness
14–15 (2010); see, e.g., David Leonhardt, When Jail Becomes Normal, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/03/briefing/protests-steve-king-coronavirus-your-wednesdaybriefing.html [https://perma.cc/GV8N-LWE6].
269. See Goodman, supra note 9, at 20–22.
270. See Michelle Alexander Gives Keynote Speech at AFSC Dinner, AFSC (June 9, 2011), https://
www.afsc.org/story/michelle-alexander-gives-keynote-speech-afsc-dinner [https://perma.cc/GLV3W6YY].
271. See Michelle Alexander, The Injustice of This Moment Is Not An ‘Aberration,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/17/opinion/sunday/michelle-alexander-new-jimcrow.html [https://perma.cc/BXL4-UA6V].
272. THOMAS ABT, BLEEDING OUT: THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF URBAN VIOLENCE—AND
A BOLD NEW PLAN FOR PEACE IN THE STREETS 3–4 (2019).
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streets. 273 Abt’s schema is evidence- and data-informed and, moreover,
it provides a platform for members of the impacted community to
speak out about these issues. 274
Abt is inspired by Oakland’s Ceasefire Strategy, an iteration of
Group Violence Intervention or Group Violence Reduction Strategy
(GVRS), which is best known for its effectiveness in reducing serious
gun and group violence using focused deterrence. 275 Central to GVRS’
success is its hyper-focused intervention addressing a specific range of
behaviors among small groups and group members. 276 These interventions are appropriately balanced because group members can either be
punished for persisting in violent behavior or choose opportunities to
improve their lives. 277 Also, GVRS is fair and legitimate because it treats
group members with dignity and allows autonomy.278
More specifically, the Ceasefire Strategy was the byproduct of concerted advocacy from community and faith-based organizations including Oakland Community Organizing. In 2013, Oakland launched
Ceasefire as a coordinated effort to identify around one hundred people
who are most likely to shoot someone and be shot. 279 A special team of
police officers focused on these individuals to make arrests and confiscate guns. 280 In the process, inclusive partnerships were formed between police, prosecutors, key community members, and social service
providers that improved public trust in law enforcement. 281
In its inaugural year, there was a “32 percent reduction in gun homicides and a 43 percent decrease in gang-involved shootings.” 282 Subsequently, Ceasefire “produced five consecutive years of reductions in fa-

273.
274.
275.
276.

Id. at 43.
Id. at 9–10.
See id. at 88–89.
See MIKE MCLIVELY & BRITTANY NIETO, A CASE STUDY IN HOPE: LESSONS FROM OAKLAND’S
REMARKABLE REDUCTION IN GUN VIOLENCE 24–26 (2019), https://policingequity.org/images/pdfsdoc/reports/A-Case-Study-in-Hope.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9VY-286W].
277. See ABT, supra note 272, at 90; NAT’L INST. CRIM. JUST. REF., OAKLAND’S SUCCESSFUL GUN
VIOLENCE REDUCTION STRATEGY 5–6 (2018).
278. See MCLIVELY & NIETO, supra note 276 at 70–71.
279. See NAT’L INST. CRIM. JUST. REF., supra note 277, at 1–3.
280. Id. at 4.
281. ANTHONY A. BRAGA, LISA M. BARAO, GREGORY ZIMMERMAN, ROD K. BRUSON, ANDREW V. PARACHRISTOS, GEORGE WOOD & CHELSEA FARRELL, OAKLAND CEASEFIRE EVALUATION: FINAL REPORT TO
THE CITY OF OAKLAND 1 (2019).
282. Study Credits Oakland Ceasefire Strategy for Reducing Gun Violence, CBS S.F. (Aug. 22, 2018,
2:31 PM), https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2018/08/22/study-credits-oakland-ceasefire-strategyfor-reducing-gun-violence/ [https://perma.cc/88XY-4EA6]; see also Press Release, Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, Lessons From Oakland’s Citywide Effort That Dramatically Reduced
Gun Violence (Apr. 24, 2019), https://giffords.org/press-release/2019/04/ugv-a-case-study-in-hope
/ [https://perma.cc/9NT7-LXRV].
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tal and non-fatal shootings.” 283 The Ceasefire Strategy seems to be
working. More specifically, “[b]etween 2010 and 2017, total Oakland
shooting victimizations peaked at 710 in 2011 . . . and decreased by 52.1
percent to a low of 340 [shooting victims] in 2017.” 284 Notably,
“Shootings fell from 557 in 2012 to 284 in 2019.” 285 Likewise, Ceasefire
intervention was associated with an estimated 31.5 percent citywide reduction in gun homicides. 286
Oakland’s strategy consists of four core components: (1) the police
identify groups and individuals who are at high risk of being involved in
a shooting, based largely on contacts with police and those who were
recently shot; (2) the police contact at-risk individuals and set up meetings with police, individuals, community leaders, crime victims, and
service providers for those individuals in an effort to stop the violence;
(3) resources are provided to at-risk individuals including “Call-In”
meetings where at-risk individuals are informed about the services
available to them; and (4) the police concentrate on a small number of
groups and individuals 287 who continue to engage in gun violence. 288 In
addition, Ceasefire purposefully recruited and mobilized people of color towards improving police-community relations. 289 The 2019 Oakland
Ceasefire Evaluation: Final Report to the City of Oakland offered this conclusion: “Ceasefire greatly enhanced the City’s capacity to systematically
and thoughtfully reduce shooting and homicides.”290 It is an effective
strategy, and is an alternative to “heavy-handed policing initiatives that
have the potential to criminalize entire communities.” 291
Oakland Mayor Libby Schaaf concurred, “In Oakland, we’ve embraced the notion that we can’t arrest our way out of the gun violence
epidemic.”292 Referring to the Oakland Ceasefire program, Schaaf
pointed out, “This approach has helped us to save lives, while also addressing the trauma of gun violence that lingers in neighborhoods long
after shots are fired.” 293 Yet Oakland’s Ceasefire program has been less
effective with the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic, which reduced
283. NAT’L INST. CRIM. JUST. REF., supra note 277, at 1.
284. See BRAGA ET AL., supra note 281.
285. Darwin BondGraham, Gun Violence: The Other Public Health Crisis That Spiked in Oakland
Last Year, OAKLANDLANDSIDE, (Apr. 27, 2021), https://oaklandside.org/2021/04/27/gun-violenceshootings-epidemic-public-health-crisis-oakland-2020-covid/ [https://perma.cc/KYP3-MK3G].
286. BRAGA ET AL., supra note 281, at 2.
287. See Press Release, Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, supra note 282.
288. See BRAGA ET AL., supra note 281, at 4; 6–7.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 7.
291. See id. at 8.
292. Press Release, Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, supra note 282.
293. See id.
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opportunities for human contact, and coincided with a contraction of
police budgets. 294 In October 2021, Oakland surpassed 100 homicides,
and outpaced both 2020 and 2019 which had 66 and 52 homicides respectively. 295
Notably, Oakland’s success with reducing gun violence gained attention from other cities and served as inspiration for similar city plans
to reduce gun violence. For instance, Mayor Lori Lightfoot acknowledged that policing alone is not the solution to systemic violence in Chicago and endorsed a gun violence reduction plan focused on individuals, communities, and systems for the next three years. 296 The Chicago
plan aims to build an effective community-based violence reduction infrastructure. Its guiding principles are focused on reducing the racial
“safety gap” across Chicago communities and helping the people and
vulnerable families who are at the highest risk of violence. 297 The plan
employs intervention and prevention strategies and advances antipoverty, economic development, and community-driven and datainformed education policies. 298 Traces of Oakland’s GVRS blueprint is
inherent in the Chicago plan, given that it relies on intervention activities focused on high-risk perpetrators and victims, and concentrates on
relationship-based policing to build trust and strengthen police legitimacy. 299
CONCLUSION
This Article hopefully adds to the growing literature on surveillance
technology and the Fourth Amendment by moving beyond a standard
analysis of ShotSpotter technology’s inaccuracy rate, misuse, and financial costs. It accomplishes this by examining how some courts are
294. See, e.g., David Debolt & Annie Sciacca, After Deadliest Day of 2021, Oakland Reels from Gun
Violence, MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 19, 2021, 4:21 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2021/04/18/afterdeadliest-day-of-2020-oakland-reels-from-epidemic-violent-crime [https://perma.cc/B5BH-6HXX];
BondGraham, supra note 285; Cristina Rendon, Oakland City Council Restores $10M in Funds to Police,
Fire Departments amid Spike in Violence, FOX2 KTVU, (Apr. 12, 2021, 9:16 PM), https://www.ktvu.com
/news/oakland-city-council-restores-10m-in-funds-to-police-fire-departments-amid-spike-inviolence [https://perma.cc/Z68N-GATS].
295. Abené Clayton, ‘This Is a Crisis’: Oakland Records 100th Homicide of 2021, Outpacing Last Year,
GUARDIAN, (Sept. 21, 2021 at 4:10 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/sep/21/oaklandcalifornia-100-homicides-2021 [https://perma.cc/NSE2-PZ5H].
296. See Lori Lightfoot, Letter from Mayor Lightfoot, Introduction to CITY OF CHI., OUR CITY, OUR
SAFETY: A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO REDUCE VIOLENCE IN CHICAGO (2020); CITY OF CHI., supra note
52, at 1, 5–6.
297. See CITY OF CHI., supra note 52, at 1.
298. Id. at 21–22.
299. See id. at 6.
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applying the exigent circumstances exception to allow police officers to
use the pretext of gunshot sounds to create reasonable suspicion where
it does not exist. In practice, the use of ShotSpotter increases the frequency of police interactions, which also increases the risk of Black
Americans becoming the victims of police brutality or harassment. Indeed, this racialized policing facilitates the status quo of violence and bias against Black Americans. As the MacArthur Justice Center at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law’s recent analysis shows, there is no evidence that ShotSpotter reduces crime. There is ample evidence that
ShotSpotter is an unreliable technology that increases police deployments and the likelihood that people are wrongfully arrested, detained,
or worse. The City of Chicago OIG’s report also found that ShotSpotter
alerts are unreliable and contribute to wrongful stop-and-frisks by the
police in already over-policed Black communities.
At the heart of this Article is the argument that the use of ShotSpotter technology is unconstitutional under Edmond because it is not used
for a specific law enforcement purpose beyond preventing crime generally. As discussed in Part I, the “primary purpose” of ShotSpotter is to satiate the government’s general interest in reducing neighborhood crime.
Both the active brief interval stopping of a car in Edmond and constant
ShotSpotter surveillance in cities nationwide are methods used to reduce crime. With roadside checkpoints, officers look for particularized
suspicion, whereas ShotSpotter listens for reasonable suspicion (indicated by the sound of a gunshot). ShotSpotter sensors, which are often
used with cameras, actively listen for the sound of gunshots, and notify
the police when they hear such gunshots; this does not serve a “specific
purpose” outside the normal purpose of preventing crime generally. Under the reasoning and result of Edmond, law enforcement is prohibited
from using ShotSpotters unless officers have reasons for individualized
suspicion.
Finally, spending more money on ineffective ShotSpotters placed in
“high crime” neighborhoods across America is not the answer to reducing gun violence. To the contrary, ShotSpotters are part of the problem.
As the conversation about racial and social equity continues, we must
consider alternative and innovative ideas for reform. As seen with Oakland’s successful Ceasefire program, innovative plans can simultaneously build trust in communities and curb gun violence. Indeed, a properly
designed GVRS will foster and maintain dignity for participants in a
program tailored to saves lives and promote community healing.

